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ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES FOR ATTORNEY
REPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AT
THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS
Adam Lamparello*
“People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty . . .
I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme
Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was
well represented at trial.”
1
—Justice Ginsburg
“After 20 years on (the) high court, I have to acknowledge that serious
questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being
fairly administered in this country. Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum
standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate
compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.”
2
—Justice O’Connor

I. INTRODUCTION
In Strickland v. Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court issued a
seminal holding that single-handedly rendered it nearly impossible for a capital
defendant to demonstrate that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel
at the underlying trial or at sentencing. Specifically, and as discussed in more
detail below, the Court held that, in order to prove that counsel’s performance was
ineffective, the defendant was required to demonstrate that counsel’s efforts fell
below an objective standard of “reasonableness,” and that such performance was
“prejudicial,” in that the alleged errors undermined confidence in the trial’s

* Associate Professor of Law & Westerfield Fellow, Loyola College of Law, New Orleans. LL.M,
New York University, 2006; J.D., Ohio State University, 2001; B.A., University of Southern California,
1997. I would like to thank my research assistant, Cosima Clements, for her tireless efforts during the
research phase of this article and, in particular, for providing invaluable feedback throughout the
drafting and revision process.
1. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, (April 10, 2001), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (emphasis added).
2. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, (April 10, 2001), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (emphasis added).
3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the defendant pleaded guilty to three murder charges and,
during the plea colloquy, explained to the court that “although he had committed a string of burglaries,
he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under
extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.” Id. at 668. In preparation for the
sentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel did not present any mitigating evidence whatsoever regarding
defendant’s background, character, or emotional state, and did not conduct any in-depth investigations
into any of these areas. Instead, counsel simply relied upon the colloquy for evidence regarding these
matters. The defendant ultimately was sentenced to death and thus sought collateral relief, alleging that
counsel’s failure to investigate and present character witnesses on defendant’s behalf constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
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outcome.4 In rendering it exceedingly difficult for defendants to succeed on
ineffective assistance claims, the Court repeatedly emphasized that “[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”5 and that “a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.”6 In this way, the Court strived to
make it difficult for defendants to succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, explaining to lower courts that they “should recognize that counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance”7 and “strategic choices
made after thorough investigation of law and facts . . .
are virtually
unchallengeable.”8
Indeed, due in substantial part to the fact that “Strickland was not intended to
impose rigorous standards on criminal defense attorneys,”9 the Court found
ineffective assistance of counsel in only one case over the next sixteen years.10
Critically, however, during this time, both state and federal courts bore witness to
some of the most horrific examples of death penalty representation in the history of
criminal jurisprudence. As set forth below, empirical data uncovered that many
attorneys representing capital defendants were under the influence of alcohol,

4. Id. at 687.
5. Id. at 689.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 690.
8. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
9. Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social History: Why Capital
Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the Services of Mitigation
Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 76 (2005) (quoting Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Cases: the Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 333). See also
Kelly Reissmann, Note, “Our System is Broken”: A Study of the Crisis Facing the Death-Eligible
Defendant, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 43, 47-48 (2002). In describing the difficulty of demonstrating that
counsel’s performance at trial was ineffective, the Author writes:
The Strickland standard for ineffective counsel is almost impossible to meet. The
burden rests with the defendant to satisfy both prongs of the test to prove that his or her
counsel was ineffective. Showing that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . may not
cause much difficulty. The prejudice requirement, however, poses great difficulty for
defendants asserting a claim of ineffective assistance. The prejudice requirement
mandates a showing that trial counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, and to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Clearly,
the prejudice prong is the most difficult element of the test to meet, especially in light of
the extreme deference to counsel.
Id. at 47.
10. Cooley, supra note 9, at 79. See also John H. Blume & Stacy Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All
Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard, and a (Partial) Return to the
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 134 (2007);
Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant’s Right to Competent Counsel: It’s Time for Some
Standards! 51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 139 (2005). Williams explains:
Strickland has proven to be inadequate in protecting a capital defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. . . . [I]t is almost as difficult to
prove ineffectiveness now as it was prior to Strickland. Courts have been unwilling to
find that an attorney’s performance was deficient even in the most egregious cases or
they have often held that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s representation.
Id.
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drugs, or both during critical aspects of the trial.11 In addition, many lawyers
literally fell asleep during presentation of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, while
others suffered from mental illnesses that affected both their preparedness and
competence.12 Furthermore, “several recent studies of capital trials reveal that
lawyers who represented death row inmates at trial were subsequently disbarred,
suspended, or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the average for
the relevant states.”13 Stated simply, “[T]he utter inadequacy of trial and appellate
lawyers for capital defendants has been widely recognized as the single most
spectacular failure in the administration of capital punishment.”14
The reason for this failure is neither mysterious nor elusive. Quite frankly,
“[T]he Court’s terse and contradictory reasoning [in Strickland] has led to the
miserable quality of capital defense advocacy.”15 As discussed above, the
“Strickland standard proved virtually impossible to meet . . . [because] [a]lmost all
representation was found to be within Strickland’s ‘wide range of professionally
competent assistance.’”16 Moreover, even where a defendant could demonstrate
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
the appeal nonetheless nearly always failed because such defendant could not
satisfy the prejudice prong, namely, showing that such representation affected the
outcome of the trial.17 More specifically, when discerning whether unreasonable
attorney performance prejudiced a defendant, “courts often deferred to
incomprehensible ‘strategic’ decisions provided by trial counsel rationalizing their

11. Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility for
Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
425, 432 (2004).
12. Id. See also Matthew J. Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense
Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF.
67 (2002).
13. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 432.
14. See Cooley, supra note 9, at 65 (quoting Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994)).
15. Id. at 79. See also Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of INeffective Assistance of Counsel,
58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1477-78 (1999) (discussing glaring examples of incompetent representation that
were deemed “effective” under Strickland). In criticizing the Court’s decision in Strickland, Klein
states:
In Strickland, the Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with the task of
determining the standard to be used for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in a
criminal case. The Court had the opportunity to render an opinion that could have
benefitted untold numbers of indigents represented by court appointed private attorneys
or public defenders. The competency of defense counsel had long been of concern and
the Court’s decision was eagerly awaited by those associations of attorneys most
involved with providing and assessing defense services. . . . [Unfortunately, t]he
Strickland Court’s clear diminution of the import of effective counsel . . . has lead to a
situation in the state and federal courts of this country wherein defense counsel are
routinely denied the time and resources with which to challenge the prosecutor’s case . .
. . The Court has reduced the Sixth Amendment to one of form over substance.
Id.
16. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
17. See id. at 142. See also George C. Thomas, III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 551 (“[T]o require prejudice in the right to counsel context is essentially to say to a
defendant that the right to a competent lawyer exists only when the state’s case is weak.”).
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slothful representation.”18 Ultimately, the problem with Strickland is that the
standard “is a very low one”19 that has been “criticized for fostering tolerance of
abysmal lawyering”20 such that, in the sixteen years following its decision, “the
Court found ineffectiveness in only one capital case.”21 Critics have gone so far as
to characterize Strickland’s two-pronged standard as “an essentially meaningless
test.”22 Perhaps the reason for this lies in the Court’s own words regarding the
Sixth Amendment, namely, that it is “not to improve the quality of legal
representation”23 nor determine “what conduct is ‘prudent or appropriate, but only
what is constitutionally compelled.’”24
Importantly, however, perhaps the most significant factor contributing to the
incompetent state of representation in capital trials arises from the lack of any
meaningful standards by which to govern the performance of attorneys in capital
trials.25 The absence of standards is deleterious particularly in capital cases because
the “unique, bifurcated nature of capital trials and the special investigation into the
defendant’s personal history and background . . . [along with] the complexity and
fluidity of the law, and the high emotional stakes involved all make capital cases
more costly and difficult to litigate than ordinary criminal trials.”26 Due to the lack
of standards governing either the appointment or performance of counsel,
defendants have often been represented by “an appointed lawyer [who] was
completely unqualified to handle a capital case,”27 counsel who was “unaware of
the governing death penalty statute,”28 a lawyer who “was not even aware that a
18. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142.
19. Cooley, supra note 9, at 76.
20. Id. at 77 (quoting William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Understanding of the Right of Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995)).
21. Id. at 79.
22. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134. See also Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225, 225 (quoting a report by the Constitution Project, which
stated that “[t]he current Supreme Court standard for effective assistance of counsel . . . permits
‘effective but fatal counsel’ and requires the defendant to show both that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance undermined the reliability of the conviction or sentence.”).
23. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
24. Cooley, supra note 9, at 79 (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)).
25. See id. at 67-68. See also Kenneth Williams, Why It Is So Difficult to Prove Innocence in
Capital Cases, 42 TULSA L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2006). Williams explains:
The only specific standard the Court has established is to require counsel to conduct an
investigation if one is warranted under the circumstances. Other than that, the Court has
refused to establish any new standards that counsel must meet, even in capital cases.
Because the test the Court has adopted is so malleable, counsel’s performance is able to
pass muster in most instances and most claims of ineffective assistance are not
successful.
Id.
26. Cooley, supra note 9, at 67-68 (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting on denial of writ of certiorari)). See generally Michael D. Moore, Note,
Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems
and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defendants, 37 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1617 (1996) (arguing
that the system of representation for indigent capital defendants is deeply flawed and systemic reforms
are necessary to provide competent counsel in the form of capital trial units who meet specific
qualifications).
27. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 433.
28. Id.
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separate sentencing proceeding would be held in a capital case,”29 and lawyers
who, quite simply, “[did] not know how to proceed.”30 Consequently, the
combination of Strickland’s deferential criteria and the lack of meaningful
standards to guide attorney performance have been the driving forces underlying
the “horrendous problems confronted by capital defendants in securing adequate
representation.”31
Ultimately, therefore, “capital defendants are typically represented by the
worst of the worst.”32 Based upon empirical studies, “[a]pproximately ninety
percent of capital defendants are indigent” and thus represented by court-appointed
attorneys.33 Moreover, in certain states, “three-quarters of those convicted of
capital murder while represented by court-appointed lawyers have been sentenced
to death.”34 In Kentucky alone, nearly a quarter of death-row inmates were
represented by attorneys who were later disbarred or had their licenses suspended.35
In Alabama, court-appointed attorneys representing capital defendants were subject
to disciplinary action, including disbarment, at a rate twenty times higher than that
of the bar as a whole, and “[f]or those attorneys whose clients were executed, the
rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that of the bar as a whole.”36
The conclusion is ineluctable—the paradigm of capital representation is broken and
requires systemic change. More specifically, the breakdown in the representation
of capital defendants can be traced both to Strickland’s highly deferential standard
and the fact that there are no specific standards that govern the performance of
attorneys representing capital defendants.
Consequently, this Article will attempt to remedy the problem of ineffective
assistance of counsel by proposing sweeping changes to: (1) the manner in which
capital defendants are represented; and (2) the method by which their cases are
reviewed on appeal. As an initial matter, this Article will focus exclusively on the
sentencing phase of the capital trial because “many capital defendants get no
meaningful support at the sentencing phase [and] . . . for this reason, claims of . . .
ineffectiveness at the penalty phase are among the most common issues raised . . .
by inmates on death row.”37 As stated by one Commentator, “[C]ertain specific
duties, such as the duty to investigate [for mitigating evidence] . . . [have] become

29. Id.
30. Id. at 434.
31. Cooley, supra note 9, at 66 (quoting Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in
Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495, 497
(1996)). See also Geimer, supra note 20, at 96-97; Talia Nye-Keif, Comment, “Capital” Punishment or
“Lack-of-Capital” Punishment? Indigent Death Penalty Defendants Are Penalized by a Procedurally
Flawed Counsel Appointment Process, 10 SCHOLAR 211, 212 (2008) (“Far too often, indigent deathpenalty defendants are appointed ineffective, inexperienced, or inexcusably incompetent counsel whose
best efforts fail both their clients and the entire justice system.”).
32. Cooley, supra note 9, at 66.
33. Jeffrey Levinson, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 149 (2001).
34. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 431.
35. Id. at 432-33.
36. Id. at 433.
37. Cooley, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting Ira Mickenburg, Ineffective Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4,
2003, at S9).
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the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel’s representation.”38 In so
doing, this Article will posit that there should exist, in each state, a Death Penalty
Representation Commission that promulgates detailed guidelines that require each
attorney to undertake specific steps to uncover mitigating evidence from various
aspects of a defendant’s background that may be relevant to the issue of culpability.
These will include, but are not limited to, medical, social, psychological,
psychiatric, educational, familial, and criminal histories.
In addition, as detailed below, defense counsel will be required, outside the
presence of the jury, to certify to the trial court that each of these steps have been
taken and explain in depth how such evidence is likely to be presented to the jury at
the penalty phase. Furthermore, if defense counsel believes that, as a strategic
matter, the investigation into or use of certain mitigating evidence is neither
advantageous nor beneficial, then counsel must certify in writing to the trial court
his specific reasons for so deciding. The purpose of these specific guidelines and
explanatory requirements is to ensure both that the quality of representation at the
trial level is increased substantially and that the record is enhanced sufficiently to
ensure meaningful and adequate appellate review in the event of an ineffective
assistance claim.
The performance of these functions also contemplates a more active trial court
in ensuring that counsel properly discharges his duty to engage in effective
representation and meaningfully advocate on his client’s behalf. Specifically,
should the trial court find defense counsel’s investigative efforts insufficient or
non-exhaustive, it will have the authority to order further corrective efforts aimed
at uncovering mitigating evidence that may bear directly upon the issue of the
defendant’s culpability. In addition, the trial court will also have oversight
responsibilities relating to the manner in which defense counsel proffers mitigating
evidence to the jury, for the purpose of ensuring that counsel’s representation is
consistent with prevailing professional norms. In this way, the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be addressed as it is happening, rather than
after a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to death, where the record is
often devoid of counsel’s omissions and hindsight’s benefits prove unavailing.
Ultimately, at the conclusion of trial, should the court determine that counsel’s
performance is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it shall issue
an opinion explaining such a decision with specificity, and with reference to the
law and facts upon which it is based.
In addition, for purposes of appellate review, this Article proposes that the
prejudice prong of Strickland be eliminated, in favor of a single inquiry into
whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. This determination would involve a presumption and burdenshifting mechanism relating directly to the trial court’s decision regarding the
competence of counsel’s performance (as well as counsel’s actual performance)
during the sentencing phase. Specifically, the appellate court shall be responsible
for reviewing the trial court’s holding that counsel’s performance was in
compliance with both the relevant guidelines and standards of professional
competence. If, after reviewing the record of counsel’s performance during the
38. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 132.
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sentencing phase, the appellate court believes that the trial court’s holding was
consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel, then this shall create a presumption that counsel’s performance was
objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The defendant would therefore be
responsible for rebutting this presumption by adducing specific evidence
demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Importantly, however, if the appellate court finds that the trial court’s decision
was erroneous, and that counsel’s representation was constitutionally defective,
then this shall create a presumption that, in fact, the defendant suffered a Sixth
Amendment violation, and the state will then be required to proffer evidence
supporting a determination that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.
In making these determinations, the appellate court shall state the reasons for its
decisions with specificity for the purpose of guiding the decisions of future courts,
the conduct of attorneys in future cases, and providing the respective state
commissions with information upon which its guidelines can be revised.39
This Article next discusses the Strickland decision, particularly its rejection of
specific standards to guide the performance of attorneys in capital cases. Next, it
details the state of death penalty jurisprudence that resulted both from Strickland’s
nearly impenetrable standard and the lack of any meaningful criteria to guide
attorney performance in capital cases, particularly at the sentencing phase. Next,
this Article proposes a new solution by which to enhance the quality of attorney
performance in capital cases through the development of specific, meaningful, and
relevant standards that would guide counsel’s representation at the sentencing
stage. Importantly, this Article focuses on the sentencing phase because so many
ineffective assistance claims focus upon counsels’ errors and omissions during
sentencing.

39. Importantly, at least some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), signal a “jurisprudential shift” from the Court’s nearly impenetrable
Strickland standard. Indeed, this view is informed by the fact that, in these three cases, the Court relied
upon the ABA guidelines for attorney representation in finding that the defendants’ trial counsel had
been ineffective. Critically, however, a closer analysis of these cases reveals that the Court not only reaffirmed Strickland, but also specifically rejected a guideline or checklist approach to assessing
ineffective assistance claims, and continued to emphasize the need to afford substantial deference to trial
counsel’s strategic decisions. In addition, a review of state and federal decisions after Williams, Wiggins,
and Rompilla reveals that courts continue to be hostile to ineffective assistance claims, and allow
terribly incompetent representation, particularly when a defendant’s life is at stake. Stated simply,
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla did not import systemic change to the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, and are more notable for the facts upon which the Court granted relief rather than the law
that it applied. However, systemic change is exactly what is needed in order to prevent the grave abuses
that defendants are suffering at the hands of incompetent attorneys and trial courts that continue to deny
ineffective assistance petitions that allege incompetence that is truly startling. Blume & Neumann,
supra note 10, at 131-32. This Article proposes precisely that systemic change.
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II. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON EXPRESSLY REJECTS THE CREATION OF STANDARDS
TO GUIDE ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE IN CAPITAL CASES, AND INSTEAD RENDERS IT
NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DEFENDANTS TO SUCCEED IN DEMONSTRATING
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. The Initial Move to a Guideline-Centered System of Representation
This Article does not represent the first time that specific, categorical
guidelines have been proposed to guide the performance of attorneys in capital
cases. Nearly four decades ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the
“Special Committee on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,”
which was designed to promulgate standards governing, inter alia, the performance
of defense counsel.40 In fact, one Commentator described this endeavor as follows:
These committees created a tentative draft in March of 1970 which included
standards for defense counsel. Although these standards were arguably general and
non-specific, when viewed in conjunction with the commentary, the standards
acted as guides for defense attorneys, establishing some minimum requirements of
competency. The new standards placed a heavy focus on certain specific duties,
such as the duty to investigate, which . . . would become the most heavily
41
scrutinized aspect of defense counsel’s representation.

Critically, the new ABA Guidelines were responsive to the perception that “a
rigorous legal standard was needed in order to increase the quality of criminal
defense representation . . . particularly in cases involving court appointed counsel
for indigent clients.”42
Additionally, the notion that specific guidelines should be developed to guide
counsel’s performance was bolstered when Chief Judge David Bazelon of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia “announced a
standard for evaluating counsel’s performance that offered real guidance to lawyers
and judges.”43 These criteria elaborated upon specific standards that were already
developed in Coles v. Peyton, a Fourth Circuit decision, where that court similarly

40. Id. at 132 (citing to ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION (Tentative Draft March 1970)).
41. Id. Importantly, Blume and Neumann describe the debate existing at that time regarding the
appropriate criteria that should govern the performance of defense counsel:
The new ABA Guidelines fueled scholarly and judicial debate regarding the appropriate
standard courts should use to resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims. One camp
believed the law should not simply be concerned with a particularly poorly represented
defendant. Rather, a rigorous legal standard was needed in order to increase the quality
of criminal defense representation across the board, particularly in cases involving court
appointed counsel for indigent clients. Statistics of unmanageable caseloads combined
with inadequate funds had surfaced, and many practitioners and scholars, including
defense attorneys themselves, had visions of mandatory funding and maximum caseload
limits that would surely follow a constitutional standard on effectiveness that had some
teeth. Others, however, believed courts should only be concerned with the reliability of
the verdict in the case under review.
Id. at 132-33.
42. Id. at 132.
43. Id. at 133.
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endorsed the use of specific standards to guide attorney representation.44
Specifically, Judge Bazelon “advocated a categorical or guideline approach that
enumerated specific duties counsel must perform,”45 which ultimately amounted to
a “check-list”46 of responsibilities that would ensure the effectiveness of counsel’s
representation.47 Indeed, Judge Bazelon’s guideline approach “is premised on the
belief that certain fundamental and specific tasks and duties must be performed in
all criminal cases.”48 As a result, Judge Bazelon sought to effectuate accountability
in defense representation through the creation of a “common set of standards that
comprise these necessary functions and considers whether counsel substantially
failed in any of the designated areas.”49
In further underscoring the accountability that these guidelines would produce,
both Judge Bazelon and the Fourth Circuit “concluded that an attorney’s ‘omission
or failure to abide by these [duties] constitutes a denial of effective [assistance] of
counsel,’ and the burden shifts to the government to establish a lack of
prejudice.”50 As Judge Bazelon held, “If a defendant shows a substantial violation
of any of these requirements he has been denied effective representation unless the
government, ‘on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these
precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby.’”51 Importantly, Judge
Bazelon’s burden-shifting provision was predicated upon the fact that “proof of
44. 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
45. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 133. See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487
F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on rehearing en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In
discussing counsel’s performance with respect to ineffective assistance claims, Judge Bazelon
enunciated the following specific standards:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer
with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights
and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable.
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if
matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection
and preparation for trial.
Id. at 1203, n.22 (citing Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d at 226).
46. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 133.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 135. See also Williams, supra note 10, at 147-54. Williams enumerates four specific
standards governing qualification, compensations, conflicts of interest, and the duty to investigate, that
should be required of every lawyer representing a capital defendant. With respect to the duty to
investigate, Williams states:
The most basic duty that an attorney has in any case is to conduct an investigation. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that counsel has a duty to investigate the defendant’s
background for potential mitigating evidence. The court needs to make it equally clear
that counsel has a duty to prepare for the guilt-innocence phase of the proceedings as
well. . . . Since claims and defenses must be asserted during the initial stages of a capital
case[s], the court should make it explicit that counsel has a duty to investigate any
potential defenses available to the defendant before reaching a conclusion as to whether
it should be asserted and that the failure to conduct a thorough pre-trial investigation
constitutes ineffective assistance.
Id. at 153-54.
49. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 135.
50. Id. at 138 (quoting Coles, 389 F.2d at 226).
51. DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1204.
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prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because counsel has been
ineffective . . . [f]or example, when counsel fails to conduct an investigation, the
record may not indicate which witnesses he could have called, or defenses he could
have raised.”52 In essence, the burden-shifting approach reflected the pragmatic
concern that “[m]uch of the evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness is frequently not
reflected in the trial record.”53
Ultimately, Judge Bazelon’s “check-list” or “guideline” approach “attempted
to define effective assistance of counsel in terms of services to defendants.”54 For
Bazelon, “the right to effective counsel . . . is not dependent upon the strength of
the evidence of the defendant’s guilt”55 because “minimum requirements of
competent attorney performance . . . would give substance to the Sixth Amendment
mandate.”56 In Judge Bazelon’s view, every defendant was constitutionally entitled
to an “active advocate,” and “[w]here such advocacy is absent, the accused has
been denied effective assistance, regardless of his guilt or innocence.”57
B. Strickland v. Washington Explicitly Rejects the Guideline Approach and Adopts
a Standard That Renders It Nearly Impossible to Establish Ineffective Assistance
1. Rejection of the Guideline Approach
Strickland dealt a devastating blow to those who supported the adoption of
specific standards to guide the performance of counsel in criminal cases.58 By way
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 138. As Blume and Neumann observe, perhaps the
greatest “service” to a defendant is to engage in a “robust investigation” that uncovers all possible
defenses and avenues for mitigating evidence:
A robust investigation was an essential demand of effective representation. . . . First, in
order for the adversary system to function properly, both sides must prepare and
organize their cases in advance of trial. . . . Second, proper investigation is critical to
uncovering favorable facts and allows trial counsel to take full advantage of procedural
safeguards for achieving a reliable verdict such as cross-examination and impeachment.
. . . Third, investigation ensures that attorneys proffer all possible legal defenses and
demand that the government prove the defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, investigation is essential for procedural matters outside of trial, such as . . .
urging for the reduction or dismissal of charges, and advocating for appropriate pleas
and favorable sentences. Consequently, the attorney who is ineffective in the
investigative phase might never be able to rectify her performance and provide her
client with an adequate defense.
Id. at 139.
55. Id. at 138.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 138-39 (quoting United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 288 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)).
58. 466 U.S. at 688-89. In Strickland, the defendant pled guilty to an indictment that included three
capital murder charges. The defendant also represented to the Court that he had no significant prior
criminal record and that he was under severe stress at the time the murders were committed. During the
sentencing phase, defense counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation into the defendant’s
background, which included a failure to contact character witnesses or seek a psychiatric examination.
Counsel believed that the inclusion of such evidence would only allow the prosecutor to come forth with
more damaging evidence against the defendant and, on this basis he decided that such evidence should
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of brief background, before Judge Bazelon’s endorsement of the guideline
approach, and prior to Strickland, “lower courts struggled to develop an appropriate
standard by which to gauge the quality of counsel’s representation.”59 In fact, to the
extent that any review of counsel’s performance existed, “the prevailing standard
lower courts used to determine whether counsel’s conduct satisfied the Sixth
Amendment was the ‘farce and mockery’ test.”60 Pursuant to this test, the courts
“asked only whether counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness was so prevalent that it made
the proceedings a ‘farce and mockery of justice,’ thereby depriving the defendant
of the constitutional right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause.”61 As one
Commentator aptly noted, “[t]his test frequently left shockingly poor representation
beyond the reach of courts to remedy.”62
Importantly, in McMann v. Richardson,63 the Court attempted to provide more
guidance, albeit generally, governing the standards for attorney incompetence.64
Unfortunately, because “trial courts had little incentive to create high standards for
appointed counsel absent more specific higher court prompting . . . [l]ower courts
often required the attorney to do little more than not make a ‘farce or mockery’ of
justice, or not be grossly incompetent.”65 Significantly, however, with the advent of
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Coles, coupled with Judge Bazelon’s guideline
approach to effective representation (as well as his burden-shifting paradigm), the
courts began to develop a standard of representation which ensured that counsel’s
performance comported with the defendant’s fundamental right to effective
representation.
Unfortunately, however, Strickland permanently changed this landscape by
expressly rejecting the guideline or check-list approach to attorney representation.66
not be introduced. As a result, counsel instead decided to rely upon the plea colloquy as evidence of the
defendant’s remorse. Ultimately, the defendant was sentenced to death, and in his appeal, defendant
alleged that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Id.
59. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 131.
60. Id. In their Article, Blume and Neumann further note that the Supreme Court subsequently
modified the “farce and mockery” test to suggest that “a defendant would prevail in proving he had
ineffective assistance if counsel’s conduct was not ‘within the [wide] range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.’” The Authors are careful to note, however, that “[o]bservers largely
criticized this vague test . . . on the basis that it was not significantly different from the ‘farce and
mockery’ standard.” Id. at 131-32.
61. Id. at 131.
62. Id.
63. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. According to one Commentator, the Supreme Court arguably
attempted to establish standards for attorney representation in McMann, in which the Court stated:
[T]he matter . . . should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with
the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are
representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
Levinson, supra note 33, at 153 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771).
65. Id. at 154.
66. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 140 (explaining that Judge Bazelon’s guideline approach
was part of a larger debate among the judges on the D.C. Circuit in the DeCoster cases concerning the
most appropriate method by which to assess ineffective assistance claims. In the end, “the categorical
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In its seminal decision concerning the effective assistance of counsel, Strickland
single-handedly defined the framework that would govern ineffective assistance
claims for the next twenty-five years.67 In its decision, while recognizing that the
right to counsel implicates the right to “effective assistance of counsel,”68 the Court
steadfastly held that “specific guidelines are not appropriate.”69 In so holding, the
Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to “counsel,” not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance . . . . In any case presenting an ineffectiveness
claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as
reflected in the American Bar Association Standards and the like . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict
the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions . . . . Indeed, the
existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the
overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause. Moreover, the
purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to
improve the quality of legal representation . . . [but] simply to ensure that criminal
70
defendants receive a fair trial.

Thus, the Strickland Court was unequivocal that counsel’s duties did not “form a
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance,”71 and instead needed
only to satisfy a “highly deferential”72 review that merely looked to whether
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”73
Ultimately, therefore, the guideline approach that was advocated by Judge
Bazelon, the Fourth Circuit in Coles, and the ABA was rejected by the Supreme
standard approach did not prove to be the prevailing standard. . . . [The] majority opinion rejected Judge
Bazelon’s theory, preferring instead a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims
similar to the method subsequently embraced by the Supreme Court in Strickland.”).
67. By way of brief background, the constitutional right to counsel was first recognized in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Supreme Court based the recognition of such right to
defendants in capital cases upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Subsequently, in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court extended the right to counsel to all criminal
defendants, not just those charged with capital crimes.
68. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In Strickland, the Court began its analysis by explaining:
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of
effective assistance in the latter class of cases—that is, those presenting claims of
“actual ineffectiveness.” In giving meaning to this requirement, however, we must take
its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.
Id.
69. Id. at 688.
70. Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 688.
72. Id. at 689.
73. Id. at 688.
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Court, and in its place was instituted a two-pronged standard for reviewing
ineffective assistance claims that has single-handedly lead to some of the worst
lawyering for those defendants who have the most at stake during trial—their
lives.74
2. The Nearly Impenetrable Two-Pronged Standard for Ineffective Assistance:
Unreasonableness and Prejudice
In eschewing the guidelines approach, the Strickland Court held that “[a]
convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.”75 According to the
Court, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.”76 Additionally, “the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”77 As set forth below, this standard made it virtually
impossible for a defendant to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal, while simultaneously tolerating incredibly incompetent representation of
defendants charged with capital offenses.
a. The Performance Prong
With respect to the performance prong, the Strickland Court began by stating
that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective
assistance.”78 Accordingly, to demonstrate that an attorney’s representation was
74. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Importantly, Justice Marshall’s
dissenting opinion in Strickland predicted precisely the type of substandard representation that would
characterize attorney performance throughout the next twenty years. In his dissent, Justice Marshall
stated:
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable
that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the
manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To
tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave
“reasonable” and must act like “a reasonably competent attorney” . . . is to tell them
almost nothing . . . the Court has thereby not only abdicated its own responsibility to
interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise
theirs.
Id. at 707-08 (citation omitted). With respect to the issue of prejudice, Justice Marshall stated:
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent.
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel . .
. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility
that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely
because of the incompetence of defense counsel. In view of all these impediments . . .
it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to
have been incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.
Id. at 710.
75. Id. at 687 (majority opinion).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 687-88. In rejecting the establishment of specific guidelines, the Court discussed the
notion of “reasonableness” in the ineffective assistance context:
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s function is
to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to
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constitutionally deficient, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”79 In so holding, and as stated
supra, the Court specifically rejected the use of guidelines in making this
determination, and instead directed courts to focus upon “whether counsel’s
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”80
Furthermore, in making the reasonableness determination, the Court stated that
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”81 In so
holding, the Court stated:
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
82
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”

In fact, in making the reasonableness determination, the Strickland Court stated
that lower courts “should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.”83 The Court went so far as to state that
“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”84

avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive
the overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed
of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process. . . . [However], [t]hese basic duties neither exhaustively define the
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney
performance.
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 688.
80. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
81. Id. at 689. The Court also stated that “when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Id. at 691.
82. Id. at 689.
83. Id. at 690.
84. Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, the majority stressed the theme throughout Strickland was
one of deference to trial counsel’s performance, even in the face of decisions that might otherwise seem
questionable. The Court’s stated position that “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” was
predicated upon a desire to lower scrutiny of defense counsel’s performance on appellate review:
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense.
Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected.
Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could
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Ultimately, what the Strickland Court was trying to accomplish—both in
rejecting specific guidelines and implementing a “highly deferential”85
reasonableness review—was both the reduction of ineffective assistance claims and
the likelihood that such claims, if brought on appeal, would fail.86 In fact, the
Strickland Court did not shy away from this objective, stating that “[t]he
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges.”87 Of course, while the reasonableness prong certainly made it difficult
for defendants to demonstrate ineffective assistance, the prejudice prong rendered it
nearly impossible.
b. The Prejudice Prong
In shifting to the prejudice aspect of its analysis, the Court emphasized that
even if counsel’s performance was “professionally unreasonable,”88 it would not
support vacating the conviction if “the error had no effect on the judgment.”89 In
the Court’s view, because “the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure
that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of
the proceeding,”90 any defects in counsel’s performance must “be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”91
Furthermore, the burden weighed on the defendant to “affirmatively prove
prejudice”92 because “[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely
to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.”93 As a
result, “[e]ven if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were
unreasonable . . . the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect
dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the
acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.
Id.
85. Id. at 689.
86. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 691.
89. Id. The Court’s prejudice requirement was premised upon its interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, which it claimed was to “ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding” and not simply to effectuate effective assistance per se. Id.
at 691-92.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 692. The Court was careful to note, of course, that there were certain situations in which
prejudice would be presumed. For example, the “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.” Id. In addition, “so are various kinds of
state interference with counsel’s assistance.” Id. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659
(1984). Finally, the Court explained that prejudice would be presumed “when counsel is burdened by an
actual conflict of interest.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 341, 345-50
(1984)). With respect to conflict of interest issues, however, the Court cautioned that “the rule is not
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above [actual or
constructive denial of assistance of counsel or state interference with the right to counsel].” Id. Instead,
the Court held that “[p]rejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively
represented conflicting interests,’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s
performance.’” Id. (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
93. Id.
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on the outcome.”94
In making the requisite showing, however, the Court held that “[i]t is not
enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding.”95 Rather, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”96 The Court went on to define “reasonable
probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”97
Thus, “[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is
a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”98
Essentially, the Court’s “prejudice” prong required a post hoc review of the
alleged errors, which was surprising given that the Court had emphasized earlier in
its opinion the need to eliminate “the distorting effects of hindsight”99 and avoid
“reconstruct[ing] the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct.”100
Ostensibly, although these principles were integral to the Court’s analysis when
developing the “reasonableness” prong, they did not seem to carry any weight as
the Court developed its nearly impenetrable “prejudice” standard.101 The reason for
this, according to the Court, was that, “the purpose of the effective assistance
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
94. Id. The origin of the Court’s prejudice requirement can be traced to the following passage in
Strickland:
Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in
attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant
affirmatively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not able
to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.
Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a
particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to
likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to
inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art,
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant
in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were
unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse
effect on the defense.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 694.
97. Id. In establishing the parameters for ineffective assistance, the Court stated:
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required
prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of
evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. An assessment
of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility
of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A defendant has no
entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be
reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards
that govern the decision.
Id. at 694-95.
98. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
99. Id. at 689.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 695.
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representation,”102 but to ensure simply “that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial.”103
Not insignificantly, the Court was also aware that more accountability
standards or detailed guidelines “would encourage the proliferation of
ineffectiveness challenges,”104 which the Court sought to avoid. Ultimately,
therefore, what resulted was such a difficult standard that, for the next sixteen
years, the Court found not one single instance of ineffective assistance of
counsel.105 Importantly, however, the Strickland decision is notable not simply for
what it failed to do, but for the horrific state of representation that it produced, both
in capital and non-capital cases.
c. Ineffective Assistance After Strickland
As a practical matter, the two-pronged standard created by the Court in
Strickland “proved virtually impossible for defendants to meet, and instead of
raising the bar for effective counsel, the Court created a bar to nearly all assertions
of attorney inadequacy.”106 Indeed, during the sixteen years after Strickland, in
which “the Supreme Court itself failed to find a single instance of constitutionally
inadequate representation,”107 nearly all representation was “found to be within
102. Id. at 689.
103. Id. When considering the Court’s notion that the Sixth Amendment was intended merely to
ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, an often overlooked passage in Strickland intimates that the
success of an ineffectiveness claim is more likely to hinge upon the strength of the prosecution’s case
rather than the quality of trial counsel’s performance:
In making this determination [concerning ineffectiveness] a court . . . must consider the
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been
affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and
some will have an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due
account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the
prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.
Id. at 695-96 (emphasis added).
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
105. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 134. See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). Significantly, the Court’s decision
in Murray also contributed to a defendant’s diminished chances of succeeding on ineffectiveness claims
because it held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires the states to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief. This is critical because postconviction relief is precisely the path upon which most defendants seek to demonstrate that counsel’s
performance at the underlying trial was ineffective. In rejecting the requirement that defendants be
appointed counsel for post-conviction proceedings, the Murray majority reasoned:
In [Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)], we ruled that neither the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the equal protection guarantee of “meaningful
access” required the State to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking
postconviction relief. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure
the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding . .
. [w]e [formerly] contrasted the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, where the State by
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Strickland’s ‘wide range of professionally competent assistance.’”108 In fact,
“[e]ven in capital cases, where life and death literally hung in the balance, courts
often deferred to incomprehensible ‘strategic’ decisions provided by trial counsel
rationalizing their slothful representation.”109 Unfortunately, in striving to reduce
the volume and success of ineffective assistance claims, Strickland created a
standard that “is a very low one”110 that “was not intended to impose rigorous
standards on criminal defense attorneys,”111 and that promoted the “tolerance of
abysmal lawyering.”112
In fact, the type of representation that is tolerated under Strickland—
particularly for capital defendants whose lives are at stake—continues to be horrific
and is the antithesis of fairness and due process of law.113 One Commentator
explains the appalling instances of attorney incompetence:
Lawyers have been found to be drunk or drugged, mentally ill, or asleep while
representing a defendant. In addition, several recent studies of capital trials reveal
that lawyers who represented death row inmates at trial were subsequently
disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the
average for the relevant states. . . . For those attorneys whose clients were
presenting witnesses and arguing to a jury attempts to strip from the defendant the
presumption of innocence and convict him of a crime, with the appellate stage of such a
proceeding, where the defendant needs an attorney “not as a shield to protect him
against being ‘hauled into court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of
innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.”
Murray, 492 U.S. at 7 (quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)).
108. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
109. Id. As Blume and Neumann explain, after Strickland, the Court decided two cases that
demonstrated how deferential it would be towards glaring examples of attorney incompetence. In
Darden v. Wainwright, the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was predicated upon the fact that his
attorney failed to present any mitigating evidence whatsoever at his sentencing hearing. 477 U.S. 168
(1986). Ostensibly, trial counsel initially believed that his client did not qualify for any of the mitigating
factors under the relevant Florida statute but then conceded that “I was completely unaware that any
mitigating circumstance, if relevant, is admissible.” Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 148 (citation
omitted). The Court, however, ultimately denied defendant’s claim because the trial court eventually
informed counsel that it could present mitigating evidence concerning any fact that might have been
pertinent. In this way, according to Blume and Neumann, “this choice to present no mitigating evidence
in light of a stated and actual misunderstanding of the law was objectively reasonable; the Court gave
short shrift to Darden’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Id. Even worse, in Burger v. Kemp, the
Court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance claim when defense counsel failed to present any
mitigating evidence whatsoever at the sentencing phase. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). This time, however, there
was evidence that Burger had an IQ that bordered on mental retardation and had an abusive family
history that resulted in Burger suffering from various psychological problems. Counsel had ample
opportunity to consult with defendant’s family, all of whom were willing to testify concerning the abuse
that Burger suffered. Ultimately, counsel halted his investigation and presented no mitigating evidence.
His stated reason not to petition the court for a complete psychological examination of his client was
based on his “experience with the mental hospital,” which he thought was “biased against defendants
generally.” Id. In its decision, while the Court found that counsel’s investigative efforts could have been
more thorough, it concluded that counsel’s efforts were objectively reasonable. Id.
110. Cooley, supra note 9, at 76.
111. Id. (quoting White, supra note 9, at 333).
112. Id. (quoting Giemer, supra note 20, at 94).
113. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (describing the pervasive problem of
deficient resources to ensure competent counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases).
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executed, the rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that of the bar
114
as a whole.

Indeed, “[i]n many instances, appellate courts have found that an appointed lawyer
was completely unqualified to handle a capital case.”115 In such cases, for example,
lawyers were “unaware of the governing death penalty statute,”116 “not even aware
that a separate sentencing proceeding would be held in a capital case,”117 or “never
tried a case to a jury before, and . . . failed to investigate physical evidence.”118
Perhaps the most shocking aspect of these egregious examples of attorney
incompetence is that, pursuant to Strickland, they were not deemed to constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.119
For example, in Bellamy v. Cogdell,120 the defendant, who was charged with
second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon,121 sought postconviction relief on the grounds that, pursuant to Strickland, he had been denied the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.122 Specifically, in the months preceding trial,
the defendant’s attorney “was the subject of disciplinary proceedings,”123 which
consisted of allegations that he “negligently handled a real estate transaction”124
and improperly “converted client funds.”125 Perhaps more importantly, in the
month prior to the trial’s commencement, the disciplinary proceeding was
postponed because the defendant’s counsel was “not mentally capable of preparing
for the hearing.”126 Indeed, the defendant’s attorney was observed as having
suffered from “a certain amount of disorientation,”127 and was later diagnosed with
“a variety of physiological ailments, including a . . . condition ‘characterized by

114. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 431-33 (citing Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996);
United States v. St. Germain, 76 F.3d 376, 1996 WL 43578, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1996) (per curiam);
Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)). See also Marcia Coyle, Fred Strasser
& Marianne Lavelle, Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation’s Death Belt, NAT’L L.J., June 11,
1990, at 30, 44; Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 398 (1995).
115. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 433.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 434.
119. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 964 (5th Cir. 2000); Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687; Fisher
v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632, 638 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
120. 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
121. Id. at 303. By way of factual background, Bellamy was on trial for his alleged participation in
the murder of State Parole Office Brian Rooney. Apparently, an individual named Lorenzo Nichols,
who was incarcerated, ordered Rooney’s murder, and Bellamy lured Rooney to the location where he
was ultimately murdered. After three weeks of trial and five days of jury deliberations, the jury
convicted Bellamy of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 303. In fact, a disciplinary hearing on these matters was scheduled for
December 11, 1986, concerning these alleged improprieties; however, that hearing was postponed due to
defense counsel’s various medical conditions, which rendered him incapable of adequately preparing.
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. Id. (citation omitted).
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peripheral motor weakness.’”128
During this time, purportedly as a result of “physical and emotional stress,”129
the defendant’s lawyer had been “virtually incapacitated”130 and had “an inability
to concentrate.”131 Based upon his condition, the treatment of which would take
between three to six months and would result in some incapacitation, the
defendant’s lawyer represented to the bar that he would secure co-counsel to assist
at the defendant’s trial.132 Ultimately, the co-counsel had an unexpected scheduling
conflict and the original attorney undertook representation alone.133 The defendant
was convicted, and approximately two months later, the defendant’s counsel was
suspended from practicing law.134 Based upon these and other grounds, the
defendant claimed that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this claim, asserting that counsel’s
behavior did not “approach the type of fraudulent behavior” that the court had
found previously to constitute ineffective assistance.135 Moreover, in denying the
128. Id. at 303 (citation omitted). More specifically, the court described trial counsel’s medical
condition as follows:
According to Dr. Cohen [trial counsel’s physician], Guren [defense counsel] suffered
from a variety of physiological ailments, including a recently diagnosed
polyneuropathy, a condition “characterized by peripheral motor weakness [and]
unsteadiness” on one’s feet. Dr. Cohen had been treating Guren for that condition for
the preceding six weeks. During that time, as a result of the “physical and emotional
stress” associated with Guran’s recently discovered illness and of certain medications,
Guran had been “virtually incapacitated.” Dr. Cohen also noted that as a result of that
condition, Guran “at times” had “an inability to concentrate.” The prognosis for Guran’s
newly discovered condition was uncertain at that time, but Dr. Cohen “anticipated” that
evaluation and treatment of the polyneuropathy would take three to six months, and that
Guran would be “effectively incapacitated during that time.”
Id. at 303-04.
129. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 304 (citation omitted).
132. Id. Critically, after the postponement of the November 10 hearing, the disciplinary committee
sought to have Guran suspended immediately and indefinitely from the practice of law. Guran
responded that such suspension was not necessary because, among other things, he was now retired and
working solely on Bellamy’s case. Furthermore, with respect to Bellamy’s representation, Guran
certified:
I, of course, will not attempt to try this case by myself. I will have a competent attorney,
but I must be present to assist him. Bellamy relies on, and strictly trusts only me and his
mother has paid me. It would be a complete disservice to this defendant and jeopardize
his right to a fair trial if I were not permitted to assist in his trial and defense.
Id. Ultimately, Guran did advise the trial court about his medical issues and pending disciplinary
charges. Id. In addition, while Guran did retain co-counsel prior to trial, he ultimately represented
Guran alone when co-counsel became involved with another case during the time of defendant’s
trial. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 307. Note, however, that in Bellamy, the defendant argued that counsel’s errors
constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment, and thus did not require the Court to apply
Strickland’s two-pronged standard. In rejecting defendant’s contention, the Second Circuit stated:
This court has found such per se violations in two limited circumstances: where,
unknown to the defendant, his or her counsel was, at the time of trial (1) not duly
licensed to practice law because of a failure ever to meet the substantive requirements
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defendant’s claim, the court placed emphasis on the fact that counsel never
“intentionally misrepresented that he would secure co-counsel,”136 and “informed
the court of his pending disciplinary hearing,”137 as well as “possible immediate
suspension.”138 Based upon these facts, which did not relate whatsoever to
counsel’s actual performance at trial, the court found that “it cannot be said that
[counsel’s] conduct approached the egregious deceptive behavior of counsel”139
that would, under Strickland, constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.
In addition, courts have rarely found alleged active drug use by defense
attorneys as a basis for Sixth Amendment violations.140 For example, in Berry v.
King,141 the defendant was charged and convicted of first-degree murder in
connection with a bank robbery.142 In asserting that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel, the defendant claimed that his counsel’s drug addiction
resulted in a failure to “adequately investigate and prepare for the defense of his
case.”143 Specifically, during the sentencing phase, counsel introduced not a single
witness on the defendant’s behalf, and offered no evidence whatsoever in
mitigation of the defendant’s culpability.144 Despite these facts, the Fifth Circuit
found that there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.145 With
respect to the issue of counsel’s drug use, the court held that “under Strickland the
fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective
assistance claim.”146
This approach was underscored in State v. Coates,147 where the Supreme Court
for the practice of law . . . or (2) implicated in the defendant’s crimes. . . . Even on
these occasions, we have applied the per se rule “without enthusiasm.”
Id. at 306.
136. Id. at 307.
137. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 307.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 308.
140. See, e.g., Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182 (Mont.
1982).
141. Berry, 765 F.2d at 451.
142. Id. at 452.
143. Id. at 454. The court summarized Berry’s assertions:
Berry’s contentions of ineffective assistance essentially fall into two closely related
categories. First, Berry contends that as a result of his alleged drug addition Blanche
[defense counsel] failed to adequately investigate and prepare for the defense of his
case. This lack of investigation and preparation allegedly caused Blanche to fail to
locate witnesses who could have supplied exculpatory information in the guilt phase and
mitigating testimony in the penalty phase. Second, Berry contends that Blanche’s drug
use, plus his failure to investigate, prevented him [from] making any sort of organized
presentation during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Berry contends that in
the guilt phase this caused Blanche to stipulate to the “functional equivalent of a plea of
guilty” without Berry’s consent. He further contends that during the sentencing phase
Blanche was unable to make more than a “tepid” plea for his client’s life.
Id.
144. Id. at 452.
145. Id. at 454-55.
146. Id. at 454 (emphasis omitted).
147. 786 P.2d at 1185-86. In Coates, the defendant, who was convicted of felony theft, alleged that
his counsel made the following errors: (1) failure to object to the use of statements made by the
defendant prior to reading the defendant his Miranda warnings; (2) opening the door to testimony
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of Montana held that trial counsel’s “cocaine abuse, which [had] become public
knowledge,” did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.148 In fact, the court
held that, unless the defendant could expressly connect “specific errors or
conduct”149 to the admitted drug abuse, then “cocaine abuse is irrelevant to the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”150 Courts have also applied this exact
logic to allegations of alcohol abuse. For example, in People v. Garrison,151 the
California Supreme Court held that, although trial counsel was “an alcoholic at the
time of trial and that he has since died of the disease,”152 there was no Sixth
Amendment violation because, under Strickland, the defendant could not
specifically demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.153 Likewise, in
Burnett v. Collins,154 the Fifth Circuit held that despite the fact that the defendant
“could smell alcohol on his attorney’s breath; and after trial, his counsel entered a

concerning prior convictions; (3) failure to suppress evidence seized from the back of the defendant’s
vehicle by challenging the probable cause of the search warrant; (4) failure to obtain witnesses that were
necessary for his defense; (5) inadequate preparation for trial; (6) failure to properly question the
witnesses; (7) failure to appeal several issues; and (8) defense counsel’s drug abuse, which allegedly
affected his ability to effectively represent the defendant. In denying defendant’s ineffective assistance
claim, the Court emphasized that it would not “second guess trial tactics [and strategy].” Id. at 1186.
148. Id. at 1186-87.
149. Id. at 1187.
150. Id.
151. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 426, 439-43 (Cal. 1989). See also Frye v. Lee, 89 F. Supp. 2d
693, 708 (W.D. N.C. 2000) (holding that trial counsel’s alcohol abuse in and of itself is insufficient to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel). In Garrison, the defendant was found guilty of robbery,
burglary, and two counts of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to death. On appeal,
defendant asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel was an
admitted alcoholic during the entire time that the trial was conducted. Defendant specifically contested
that trial counsel’s alcoholism constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. In rejecting this
contention, the Supreme Court of California stated:
Although it is uncontested that Beardsley [defense counsel] was an alcoholic at the time
of trial and that he has since died of the disease, defendant has failed to prove that
Beardsley’s performance was deficient. His reliance on a per se rule of deficiency for
alcoholic attorneys is contrary to settled law. . . . It is undisputed that Beardsley was an
alcoholic at the time of his representation and that he consumed large amounts of
alcohol each day of the trial. The declarations in the petition and traverse indicate that
Beardsley drank in the morning, during court recesses, and throughout the evening.
Although these declarations confirm that Beardsley was an alcoholic, they do not
address whether Beardsley’s addiction adversely affected his courtroom performance to
such an extent that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. Statements
made by the bailiff . . . Hector Delgadillo, declares that he was in close contact with
Beardsley throughout the trial [and] that Beardsley always smelled of alcohol. . . . [In
addition], on the second day of jury selection, Beardsley was arrested for driving to the
courthouse with a .27 blood-alcohol content. . . . The judge stated that Beardsley’s
courtroom behavior had not given him any reason to believe that Beardsley should not
continue and told defendant, “I personally can assure you that you probably have one of
the finest defense counsel in this county. . . . ” Our review of the facts indicate that
Beardsley did a fine job in this case . . . there is no authority for the type of per se rule
espoused by defendant.
Garrison, 765 P.2d at 440-41.
152. Id. at 440.
153. Id. at 440-41.
154. 982 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
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facility for treatment of alcohol abuse,” there was no violation of the right to
counsel because the defendant could identify “no specific instances where
counsel’s performance . . . was deficient because of alcohol abuse.”155
More startling, perhaps, is the fact that ineffective assistance claims have been
rejected under Strickland where trial counsel has slept during portions of the
trial.156 For example, in United States v. Muyet,157 while the court actually
acknowledged that even if counsel was, in fact, sleeping in court, the trial court
denied the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim because he was not “in a state
of unconsciousness (actually snoring in the courtroom) throughout the trial.”158 As
a result, despite periods of falling asleep during trial, counsel’s conduct was
deemed not to fall below “prevailing professional norms.”159 Similarly, in Tippins
v. Walker,160 the Second Circuit held that “[p]rolonged inattention during stretches
of a long trial (by sleep, preoccupation or otherwise) . . . may be quantitatively
substantial but without consequence.”161 Likewise, in Burdine v. Johnson,162 the
Fifth Circuit stated that “we decline to adopt a per se rule that any dozing by
defense counsel during trial merits a presumption of prejudice [under
Strickland].”163
Finally, the courts have been reticent to find ineffective assistance even where
there exists evidence that the defendant’s counsel is suffering from a mental
illness.164 In Smith v. YLST,165 the defendant alleged that his trial counsel’s erratic
behavior during trial was due to an underlying mental illness that affected his
performance.166 Specifically, in declarations and supplemental material submitted
by various individuals with knowledge of counsel’s behavior, including his
associate and secretary, it was alleged that counsel was suffering from a “paranoid

155. Id. at 930. In fact, in rejecting the defendant’s contention, the court revealed just how difficult it
is for a defendant to succeed in demonstrating that trial counsel’s substance abuse was sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant a finding of ineffective assistance:
The critical inquiry [under Strickland] is whether, for whatever reason, counsel’s
performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant. . . .
Burnett’s claim is nothing more than a bare assertion that since his counsel abused
alcohol, his counsel was ineffective. . . . Burnett has failed to even show that counsel
was impaired during trial due to alcohol abuse. . . . At the hearing, the investigator for
the defense indicated that he did not observe defense counsel intoxicated during trial.
Burnett’s defense counsel also testified that he was not intoxicated during the trial.
Burnett has failed to show that his counsel was impaired at trial or that any impairment
caused specific errors during trial . . . [w]e must, therefore, reject his contention that his
attorney’s alcohol use resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. (citation omitted).
156. See, e.g., Burdine, 262 F.3d 336; Tippins, 77 F.3d 682.
157. 994 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
158. Id. at 560-61.
159. Id. at 561.
160. Tippins, 77 F.3d at 686.
161. Id.
162. Burdine, 262 F.3d 336.
163. Id. at 349.
164. See generally Smith v. YLST, 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 874.
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psychotic reaction.”167 The declarations stated that counsel feared for his own
safety and “that of his client because he believed that his client was the target of a
murder conspiracy involving the victim’s relatives and lover.”168 It was also
revealed that counsel “smoked marijuana one evening during the course of the
trial”169 and told his secretary that “he was crazy and wanted to go to an insane
asylum.”170 Counsel “also repeatedly expressed concern that people were going to
try to kill him,” and the trial court observed that, at times, counsel’s behavior had
been erratic.171
This was not sufficient under Strickland, however, to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit specifically found that “[a]lthough there is
merit to the argument that a mentally unstable attorney may make errors of
judgment,”172 there could be no violation of the Sixth Amendment unless the
defendant could “point to specific errors or omissions which prejudiced his
defense.”173 As a result, even if the defendant can demonstrate that trial counsel
suffered from a “mental illness or defect”174 that had “some impact on the
attorney’s professional judgment,”175 it would still not be enough to satisfy the
Strickland standard unless it could also be proven that such illness was “manifested
in his courtroom behavior and conduct of the trial.”176
These cases provide a demonstration of the type of representation that
Strickland tolerates, even when a defendant’s life is at stake. If a defendant proves
that his counsel was using drugs,177 abusing alcohol,178 sleeping during portions of
the trial,179 or suffering from mental illness,180 this showing will not be even
remotely close to the threshold necessary to demonstrate ineffective assistance.
Furthermore, if a defendant can provide that any or all of these factors are present,
and that they caused counsel’s performance to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness, then relief still will not be provided unless a showing of prejudice
can be made. That is, a defendant can rarely, if ever, demonstrate conclusively,
and through the “distorting effects of hindsight,”181 that, but for counsel’s
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Smith, 826 F.2d at 874.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 876. In denying defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance, the court acknowledged,
based upon evidence in the record, that “although Daul’s [defense counsel’s] behavior had at times been
erratic, his conduct had no impact on the trial because the judge had not been influenced by Daul’s
behavior.” Id. at 874. In addition, the Court relied upon the trial court’s finding in holding that “even if
Daul was having some kind of breakdown, ‘the record and my recollection do not show any way in
which the trial was distorted or the effectiveness of counsel was impaired by whatever conditions he
had.’” Id.
173. Id. at 876.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Smith, 826 F.2d at 876.
177. Berry, 765 F.2d at 452.
178. Burnett, 982 F.2d at 930.
179. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. at 560.
180. Smith, 826 F.2d at 872.
181. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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misfeasance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.182 Put another
way, those fairly rare cases “that navigated safely through the performance prong
channel generally went aground on the rock of prejudice.”183
Stated simply, Strickland was, as a practical matter, impenetrable, and it was
no accident that for sixteen years the Supreme Court found not a single case of
ineffective assistance.184 In fact, at the state level, during the period from 1994
through 2000, only thirty-four capital cases resulted in successful ineffective
assistance claims.185 At the federal level, for this same period, only thirty-two
capital cases successfully navigated through the Strickland standard.186 Quite
simply, it should come as no surprise that, during this time, courts bore witness to
particularly horrific examples of defense representation, made worse by the fact
that, in many cases, a defendant’s life was at stake.
Recently, however, some Commentators have found evidence of a

182. Id. at 694.
183. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142. See also Fogelman, supra note 12, at 78. With
respect to Strickland’s second prong (the prejudice requirement), Fogelman states:
A central reason that Strickland has been so heavily criticized for creating an “almost
insurmountable hurdle” for defendants claiming ineffective assistance is the extreme
difficulty in establishing the second prong—that the defendant was treated with actual
prejudice because of counsel’s deficient conduct. Strickland stated that a defendant must
show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The Court then defines a
reasonable probability as “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Requiring a defendant to bear the burden of demonstrating a “reasonable probability”
that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s ineffective
assistance is merely a deceptive way of saying that the defendant must prove that he
would have been acquitted. In other words, he must prove his innocence rather than
forcing the state to prove his guilt. Strickland allows appellate courts to bypass the first
prong of evaluating counsel’s performance and simply analyze the difficult-to-meet
prejudice requirement, because if a defendant cannot effectively prove his innocence,
his counsel’s performance is irrelevant.
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
184. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134.
185. Id. at 156 tbl.1. See also Fogelman, supra note 12, at 79-80. Fogelman states:
[A]n appellate court can uphold a verdict particularly easily when the government has a
strong case against the defendant, even though that is arguably when a defendant needs
effective assistance of counsel the most. After Strickland, less than “mediocre
assistance” is acceptable because Strickland’s broad deference to counsel’s
performance allows appellate courts to merely view egregious errors as trial tactics. In
applying Strickland, appellate courts tend to focus on errors of commission rather than
omission because those courts are not easily able to “discern the prejudicial effects of
errors of omission.” . . . As examples, the ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to
interview a crucial defense or failing to object during direct examination could be the
very reason that the record does not reflect any prejudice to a defendant for an appeals
court to review. If defense counsel was sleeping, the record would be silent as to certain
errors for exactly that reason—a dozing defense counsel is unable to speak or object,
and the record, in turn, would reflect no error. . . . But Strickland has basically ensured
that representation can be atrocious as long as defense counsel does not commit an
egregious error on [the] record that cannot be explained away as strategy.
Id. at 79-80 (citations omitted).
186. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 156 tbl.1.
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“jurisprudential shift”187 in the Supreme Court’s analysis of ineffective assistance
claims.188 Specifically, in the past eight years, the Court has found Sixth
Amendment violations in three cases, and in each case the Court relied upon the
respective trial counsel’s failure to follow the ABA Guidelines, which were in their
third edition since the original version of 1970, as evidence of objectively
unreasonable and prejudicial performance.189 As a result, Professor Neumann has
declared that these decisions evince a “chink in Strickland’s armor” and a “shift
towards . . . the standard . . . once hailed by Judge Bazelon.”190 In fact, Professor
Neumann has gone so far as to state:
[T]his shift [to a guideline approach] was intentional . . . [and] the reality was that
in the hands of most state courts and many federal courts of appeal, the Strickland
performance prong was license to do nothing. In essence, the Supreme Court
realized that Strickland was part of the problem, not a solution to poor
representation in capital cases. Capital defendants were frequently being
represented by ineffective counsel, and the high threshold of the Strickland
191
standard tied the hands of appellate courts from doing much about the problem.

In fact, Professor Neumann has declared that “faced with the reality of the
representation and the ineffectiveness of the review process, the Court has adopted
the general approach Judge Bazelon articulated thirty years prior.”192
Importantly, however, although the Court’s decisions in Williams v. Taylor,193
Wiggins v. Smith,194 and Rompilla v. Beard195 certainly demonstrate that the Court
is reviewing trial counsel’s performance under a higher level of scrutiny, they
presage neither the overruling of Strickland nor the adoption of specific guidelines
by which counsel’s performance will be measured in future cases. While Williams,
Wiggins, and Rompilla provide reason for optimism that the standards governing
ineffective assistance claims are indeed beginning to evolve, they do not in and of
themselves signify a substantial and sustained departure from the jurisprudence that
continues to tolerate extraordinary examples of incompetent representation in
capital cases. In other words, defendants charged with some of the worst crimes
are still the victims of terribly poor representation, and despite the Supreme Court’s
recent rulings, the courts continue to be hostile to their ineffective assistance
claims.196 This fact alone demonstrates that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla
represent the beginning, not the end, of the solution to nearly thirty years of
injustice. An examination of these cases both reveals reason for hope but the
continued necessity for sweeping change.197

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 147.
See cases cited infra notes 193-95.
Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142-47.
Id. at 142, 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
529 U.S. 362.
539 U.S. 510.
545 U.S. 374.
Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142-47.
Id. at 160-61.
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III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FINDS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN
WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR, WIGGINS V. SMITH, AND ROMPILLA V. BEARD, WHILE RELYING
UPON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S GUIDELINES IN ASSESSING TRIAL
COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE
As set forth above in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, although the Supreme
Court found that trial counsels’ performance constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel, these decisions did not effectuate the sweeping change that is necessary to
prevent the “abysmal lawyering”198 that continues to exist without remedy at both
the state and federal levels. Although some Commentators believe that these
decisions signified a return to a “guidelines” or “checklist” approach to ineffective
assistance claims,199 such assertions, when analyzing each opinion, are overstated.
A close analysis of each opinion reveals that Strickland continues to remain good
law when ineffective assistance claims are raised.
In addition, the ABA standards, although helpful, continue to serve merely as
guides, which is precisely how the Court described them in Strickland, and do not
operate as mandatory rules or benchmarks. Finally, at least one study conducted
after these decisions were rendered reveals that there has been only a modest
increase in the success of ineffective assistance claims, as courts continue to
tolerate incompetent representation on behalf of capital defendants.200 As a result,
the necessity for sweeping change could not be more evident.
A. Williams v. Taylor
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of robbery and capital murder.201
During his sentencing hearing, the prosecution introduced evidence of Williams’s
prior convictions, which included armed robbery, burglary, and grand larceny.202
The prosecution also introduced evidence relating to other violent felonies that
Williams had committed after the murder, some of which were the subject of his

198. Cooley, supra note 9, at 77 (quoting Giemer, supra note 20, at 94).
199. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 152-53. Indeed, when discussing Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla, Blume and Neumann state:
[T]he most significant doctrinal development was the Court’s reliance on the ABA’s
Guidelines. The ABA Guidelines and Standards regarding the obligation to thoroughly
investigate permeate Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Much like Judge Bazelon’s
original checklist approach, the Court basically adopted the ABA’s Guideline
requirements for investigation as establishing the prevailing norms for defense counsel.
In effect, when considering the adequacy of trial counsel’s investigation, courts must
now look to ABA standards, as well as local practice, in order to determine whether the
Sixth Amendment has been satisfied. . . . In essence, these three decisions mark a shift
towards the effective assistance of counsel standard once hailed by Judge Bazelon.
Id. at 152-53.
200. Id. at 156-57.
201. Williams, 529 U.S. at 368. By way of factual background, on November 3, 1985, the victim,
Harris Stone, was found dead in Danville, Virginia. State officials initially determined the cause of death
to be blood alcohol poisoning. However, approximately six months after Stone’s death, defendant
Williams drafted a letter to the police in which he admitted to murdering Stone, and on this basis, he
was charged and convicted of the crime. Id. at 367.
202. Id. at 368.
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confession.203 After presenting this evidence, the prosecution presented two expert
witnesses who testified that “there was a ‘high probability’ that Williams would
pose a serious continuing threat to society.”204
Thereafter, Williams’s defense counsel offered the testimony of his mother,
two neighbors, and a taped excerpt by a psychiatrist, who stated that Williams had
removed bullets from his gun during a robbery to prevent injury to the victims.205
Williams’s defense counsel offered no other mitigating evidence. In addition,
during defense counsel’s closing, counsel admitted that is was “difficult to find a
reason why the jury should spare Williams’s life”:206
I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man who
maybe has not shown much mercy himself. . . . I doubt very seriously that he had
mercy very highly on his mind when he was walking along West Green and the
incident with Alberta Stroud. I doubt very seriously that he had mercy on his mind
when he took two cars that didn’t belong to him. Admittedly it is very difficult to
get us and ask that you give this man mercy when he has shown so little of it
207
himself.

Not surprisingly, the jury sentenced
subsequently determined that the death
sentence.209 Thereafter, Williams filed for
was the victim of ineffective assistance
claimed that his trial counsel failed to

Williams to death.208 The trial court
penalty was a “proper” and “just”
state collateral relief, alleging that he
of counsel.210 Specifically, Williams
investigate and present substantially

203. Id. Specifically, the evidence introduced against Williams included:
[T]he prosecution proved that Williams had been convicted of armed robbery in 1976
and burglary and grand larceny in 1982. The prosecution also introduced the written
confessions that Williams had made [regarding the murder] . . . . The prosecution
described two auto thefts and two separate violent assaults on elderly victims
perpetrated after the Stone murder. On December 4, 1985, Williams had started a fire
outside one victim’s residence before attacking and robbing him. On March 5, 1986,
Williams had brutally assaulted an elderly woman on West Green Street—an incident
he had mentioned in his letter to the police. That confession was particularly damaging
because other evidence established that the woman was in a “vegetative state” and not
expected to recover. Williams had also been convicted of arson for setting a fire in the
jail while awaiting trial in this case.
Id. at 368-69 (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 368-69.
205. Id. at 369. Additionally, Williams’s counsel’s performance during cross-examination of the
prosecution’s witnesses included:
Williams’ counsel repeatedly emphasized the fact that Williams had initiated the contact
with the police that enabled them to solve the murder and to identify him as the
perpetrator of the recent assaults, as well as the car thefts. In closing argument,
Williams’ counsel characterized Williams’ confessional statements as “dumb,” but
asked the jury to give weight to the fact that he had “turned himself in, not on one crime
but on four . . . that the [police otherwise] would not have solved.”
Id.
206. Id.
207. Williams, 529 U.S. at 369 n.2.
208. Id. at 370.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.211 This evidence included documents
detailing Williams’s commitment when he was eleven years old “that dramatically
described mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood, as well as
testimony that he was ‘borderline mentally retarded,’ had suffered repeated head
injuries, and might have mental impairments organic in origin.”212 In addition, the
same experts that testified on the prosecution’s behalf stated that Williams would
not pose a danger to society if kept in a structured environment.213
Based upon this evidence, the same judge who had sentenced Williams to
death also found that Williams had been denied the effective assistance of counsel
and ordered a new sentencing hearing.214 The Virginia Supreme Court, however,
reversed the trial court, and Williams then sought relief in federal court, which
reversed the Virginia Supreme Court and granted Williams’s petition.215 However,
the Fourth Circuit later overruled the district court, and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.216
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and, for the first time in
sixteen years, found that a defendant had been denied the right to effective
assistance of counsel.217 In so holding, the Court began by explaining that “the
merits of [the defendant’s] claim are squarely governed by our holding in
Strickland v. Washington.”218 Accordingly, in stating that Strickland constituted
“clearly established Federal law,”219 the Court held that Williams must first
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that such performance prejudiced the defense.220
In finding that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, the
Court relied almost exclusively on Strickland, and predicated its holding upon
counsel’s failure to introduce critical mitigating evidence that would likely have
influenced the jury’s decision at the penalty phase.221 The Court held:
The record establishes that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the sentencing]
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 371.
Id. at 370-71.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 390.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 395-99. The Court further stated:
Of course, not all of the additional [mitigating] evidence was favorable to Williams. The
juvenile records revealed that he had been thrice committed to the juvenile system—for
aiding and abetting larceny when he was 11 years old, for pulling a false alarm when he
was 12, and for breaking and entering when he was 15. But as the Federal District Court
correctly observed, the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of
evidence that did speak in Williams’ favor was not justified by a tactical decision to
focus on Williams’ voluntary confession. Whether or not those omissions were
sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, they clearly
demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant’s background.
Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
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phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial. They failed to conduct an
investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing
Williams’s nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but
because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had
they done so, the jury would have learned that Williams’s parents had been
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had
been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to
the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’
incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his
222
parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.

The Court was also critical of Williams’s counsel because he “failed to introduce
available evidence that Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not
advance beyond the sixth grade in school.”223 In addition, the Court criticized
counsel for failing to introduce evidence detailing “Williams’s commendations for
helping crack a prison drug ring”224 or concerning “the testimony of prison officials
who described Williams as among the inmates ‘least likely to act in a violent,
dangerous or provocative way.’”225 As a result, relying in part upon ABA Standard
4-4.1, the Court concluded that Williams’s counsel “did not fulfill their obligation
to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”226 Based upon
these and other omissions, the Court held that Williams had been denied the
effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.227
Critically, however, nothing in Williams indicated that the Court was reluctant
to apply Strickland or willing to modify its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In
fact, the opposite is true, as the Court explained that its decision was “squarely
governed”228 by Strickland, which it characterized as “clearly established Federal
law.”229 Furthermore, although the Court did cite to the ABA Guidelines in parts of
its holding, not one sentence in its decision even suggested that the Guidelines were
to play a role any more significant than Strickland originally contemplated—as

222. Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
224. Id.
225. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 396.
227. Id. at 399. Specifically, the Court held that Williams was prejudiced by the failure of his
attorneys to investigate and present the powerful mitigating evidence concerning his character and
background:
We are also persuaded, unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, that counsel’s
unprofessional service prejudiced Williams within the meaning of Strickland. After
hearing the additional evidence developed in the postconviction proceedings, the very
judge who presided at Williams’ trial, and who once determined that the death penalty
was “just” and “appropriate,” concluded that there existed a “reasonable probability that
the result of the sentencing phase would have been different” if the jury had heard that
evidence. . . . Judge Ingram did stress the importance of mitigation evidence in making
his “outcome determination,” but it is clear that his predictive judgment rested on his
assessment of the totality of the omitted evidence rather than on the notion that a single
item of omitted evidence, no matter how trivial, would require a new hearing.
Id. at 396-97.
228. Id. at 390.
229. Id. at 391.
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guides rather than benchmarks.230 The core of the Williams holding was based not
upon the enunciation or implementation of a new standard, but upon the
recognition that Williams’s lawyer had failed in nearly every respect to present
mitigating evidence that likely would have spared his client the penalty of death.
B. Wiggins v. Smith
In Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of capital murder by a Maryland
judge and sentenced to death by a jury.231 The defendant’s trial counsel moved to
bifurcate the sentencing hearing, in which they would first argue that Wiggins was
not principally responsible for the victim’s death and, if necessary, present a
mitigation case.232 The court subsequently denied this motion, and at the sentencing
phase Wiggins’s attorneys re-asserted his innocence yet offered no mitigating
evidence whatsoever.233 Indeed, while counsel told the jury in her opening
statements that it would hear evidence concerning “Wiggins’s difficult life,”234
such evidence was never introduced. The jury ultimately sentenced Wiggins to
death.235
Thereafter, Wiggins sought post-conviction relief, arguing that “his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background.”236 Specifically, Wiggins
presented evidence by a forensic social worker concerning “the severe physical and
sexual abuse he had suffered at the hands of his mother and while under the care of
a series of foster parents.”237 Both the trial court and state court of appeals denied
Wiggins’s motion, but the federal district court granted Wiggins’s habeas
petition.238 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding “trial counsel’s strategic decision
to focus on Wiggins’s direct responsibility to be reasonable.”239
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that Wiggins’s
230. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
231. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16.
232. Id. at 515.
233. Id. at 515-16.
234. Id. at 515. Specifically, the record reveals the following regarding trial counsel’s conduct at
sentencing:
On October 12, the court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings
commenced immediately thereafter. In her opening statement, Nethercott [defense
counsel] told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than
Wiggins actually killed [the victim]. Counsel then explained that the judge would
instruct them to weigh Wiggins’ clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She
concluded: “You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not
been easy for him. But he’s worked. He’s tried to be a productive citizen, and he’s
reached the age of 27 with no conviction for prior crimes of violence and no
convictions, period. . . . I think that’s an important thing for you to consider.” During
the proceedings themselves, however, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life
history.
Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 516.
236. Id.
237. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516.
238. Id. at 517-18.
239. Id. at 519.
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counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.240 In so holding, the Court again
began its analysis by setting forth the “established . . . legal principles that govern
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” namely, the two-pronged Strickland
test.241 Furthermore, at the outset the Court specifically stated that “[w]e have
declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and
instead have emphasized that ‘[t]he proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’”242
The Court’s finding of ineffectiveness was based primarily upon the fact that
counsel failed to present critical mitigating evidence that would likely have
affected the outcome of the sentencing phase.243 Put differently, trial counsel’s
decision to limit their investigation into various potential sources of mitigating
evidence was not objectively reasonable and ultimately prejudiced the defendant.244
For example, the record demonstrated that counsel’s investigation produced
information from three sources.245 First, a psychologist conducted certain tests on
the defendant, Wiggins, which revealed that he had an IQ of seventy-nine and
“exhibited features of a personality disorder.”246 In addition, the pre-sentence
investigation report contained Wiggins’s own description of his youth as
“disgusting,” while noting that he spent most of his life in foster care.247 Counsel’s
final source of information was certain records kept by the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services, which documented Wiggins’s placement in various
foster homes throughout his childhood.248 Ultimately, counsel decided not to
expand their investigation beyond this information and focused their efforts during
the sentencing phase to re-arguing the issue of Wiggins’s responsibility for the
murder.249
It was counsel’s failure to probe further into Wiggins’s background that
240. Id. at 534-38.
241. Id. at 521.
242. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
243. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-35.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 523.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. Specifically, the Court found that counsel’s decision to limit their
investigation to the pre-sentencing report and records kept by the Department of Social Services was
constitutionally defective:
[S]tandard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins’ trial included
the preparation of a social history report. Despite the fact that the Public Defender’s
office made funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose
not to commission such a report. Counsel’s conduct similarly fell short of the standards
for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—
standards to which we have long referred as “guides to determining what is reasonable.”
The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence “should
comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence
to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Despite
these well-defined norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of
petitioner’s background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his
history from a narrow set of sources.
Id. at 524 (citations omitted).
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formed the basis for the Court’s finding of ineffective assistance.250 First, the Court
noted that the information that counsel initially discovered in the social service
records should have prompted further inquiries rather than halt the investigation
altogether.251 Indeed, the social service records revealed that Wiggins’s mother was
a chronic alcoholic; that he was transferred to various foster homes throughout his
childhood, often experiencing emotional difficulties; that he had frequent absences
from school; and that “his mother [often] left him and his siblings alone for days
without food.”252
The Court explained that if counsel had conducted a proper investigation, they
would have uncovered the following facts:
Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years of his life
while in the custody of his alcoholic, abusive mother. He suffered physical
torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in
foster care. [According to the Court] [t]he time Wiggins spent homeless, along
253
with his diminished mental capacities . . . further augment his mitigation case.

Furthermore, the Court noted that it was particularly egregious for trial counsel to
instruct the jury during the sentencing phase that it would hear evidence concerning
Wiggins’s “difficult life,”254 yet never ultimately present any evidence of this
“difficult life.”255
Importantly, in Wiggins, as in Williams, the Court made no suggestion,
implicitly or explicitly, that it was modifying or otherwise reassessing the viability
of Strickland. In fact, the opposite is true. Yet again, the Court specifically
“declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct,”256 and
while it did rely upon the ABA Standards in its opinion, it specifically referred to

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 524-25.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 526.
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. In fact, with respect to this issue, the Court stated:
The record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of
counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted
from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment . . . during the sentencing proceeding
itself, counsel did not focus exclusively on Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the
murder. After introducing that issue in her opening statement, Nethercott entreated the
jury to consider not just what Wiggins “is found to have done,” but also “who [he] is.”
Though she told the jury it would “hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life,”
counsel never followed up on that suggestion with details of Wiggins’ history. At the
same time, counsel called a criminologist to testify that inmates serving life sentences
tend to adjust well and refrain from further violence in prison-testimony with no bearing
on whether petitioner committed the murder by his own hand. Far from focusing
exclusively on petitioner’s direct responsibility, then, counsel put on a half-hearted
mitigation case, taking precisely the type of “shotgun” approach the Maryland Court of
Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid. When viewed in this light, the “strategic
decision” the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit
of mitigating evidence resembles more [of] a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s
conduct rather than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.
Id. at 526-27 (citations omitted).
256. Id. at 521.
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them, in the context of Strickland, as “standards to which we long have referred as
‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’”257 The Court was not breaking new
ground in Wiggins. It was simply recognizing and condemning one egregious case
of attorney incompetence.
C . Rompilla v. Beard
In Rompilla, the defendant was convicted of murder.258 During the penalty
phase, the prosecutor sought to prove several aggravating factors to justify a death
sentence, one of which was that “Rompilla had a significant history of felony
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.”259 The prosecutor presented
evidence on all three of these factors and the jury found all of them proven.260 In
response, Rompilla’s counsel presented a mitigation case that consisted of five
family members that argued for “residual doubt”261 (which appeals to lingering
doubts about the defendant’s guilt) and asked the jury for mercy, “saying [that]
they believed Rompilla was innocent and a good man.”262 Ultimately, the jury
sentenced Rompilla to death.263
Subsequently, Rompilla sought post-conviction relief in which he alleged that
his counsel’s performance was ineffective “in failing to present significant
mitigating evidence about Rompilla’s childhood, mental capacities and health, and
alcoholism.”264 The state court, as well as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
denied Rompilla’s request.265 However, the federal district court granted
Rompilla’s claim, holding that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to
investigate “‘pretty obvious signs’ that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and
suffered from mental illness and alcoholism.”266 On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed, finding that counsel’s investigation into mitigating evidence, which
consisted of interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as well as
consultations with three mental health experts, was constitutionally sufficient.267
257. Id. at 524.
258. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377-78.
259. Id. at 378. The other two aggravating factors were that: (1) the murder was committed in the
course of another felony; and (2) the murder was committed by torture. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. Specifically, “Rompilla’s 14-year-old son testified that he loved his father and would visit
him in prison.” Id. While the jury found “in mitigation, that Rompilla’s son had testified on his behalf
and that rehabilitation was possible,” they “assigned the greater weight to the aggravating factors” and
thus sentenced Rompilla to death. Id.
263. Id.
264. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 379.
267. Id. The Supreme Court summarized the Third Circuit’s reasoning:
The majority found nothing unreasonable in the state court’s application of
Strickland, given defense counsel’s efforts to uncover mitigation material, which
included interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as well as consultation
with three mental health experts. Although the majority noted that the lawyers did not
unearth the “useful information” to be found in Rompilla’s” school, medical, police and
prison records,” it thought the lawyers were justified in failing to hunt through these
records when their other efforts gave [them] no reason to believe the search would yield
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rompilla was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.268 The Court commenced its analysis by re-asserting
Strickland’s governing legal principles, and noting that “hindsight is discounted by
pegging adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are
made, and by giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’”269
The Court first observed that trial counsel’s only sources of mitigation were
Rompilla himself, five members of his family, and three mental health witnesses
who examined Rompilla prior to the sentencing phase.270 Thereafter, the Court
delineated several additional avenues that Rompilla’s counsel could have pursued
to “cast light” on his mental condition or otherwise discover additional mitigating
evidence.271 For example, the Court noted that counsel could have searched school
records and information regarding juvenile and adult incarcerations.272 Importantly,
however, the Court followed Strickland’s mandate that the failure to pursue these
lines of inquiry was not tantamount to ineffective assistance because trial counsel
was not required to “scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up.”273
Critically, however, the Court found that counsel’s performance was
constitutionally infirm because Rompilla’s lawyers failed to examine the file
containing the prior convictions upon which the prosecution relied in proving one
of its aggravating factors.274 The Court cited various reasons in support of its
finding, first that “[c]ounsel knew that the Commonwealth intended to seek the
death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions
indicating the use or threat of violence, an aggravator under state law.”275 Counsel
also knew that the prosecution would specify his “prior conviction for rape and
assault, and would emphasize his violent character by introducing a transcript of
the rape victim’s testimony given in [his] earlier trial.”276 The Court, therefore,
found it unreasonable for counsel to not even examine the information that the
prosecution planned to present in support of its argument in favor of the death

anything helpful. The panel thus distinguished Rompilla’s case from Wiggins v. Smith.
Whereas Wiggins’s counsel failed to investigate adequately, to the point even of
ignoring the leads their limited enquiry yielded, the Court of Appeals saw the Rompilla
investigation as going far enough to leave counsel with reason for thinking further
efforts would not be a wise use of the limited resources they had.
Id. (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 380.
269. Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
270. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381-82.
271. Id. at 382.
272. Id. The Court also stated:
And while counsel knew from police reports provided in pretrial discovery that
Rompilla had been drinking heavily at the time of his offense . . . and although one of
the mental health experts reported that Rompilla’s troubles with alcohol merited further
investigation, counsel did not look for evidence of a history of dependence on alcohol
that might have extenuating significance.
Id.
273. Id. at 383. With respect to these issues, the Court explained that “reasonably diligent counsel
may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383.
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penalty.277 As the Court stated:
[I]t is difficult to see how counsel could have failed to realize that without
examining the readily available file they were seriously compromising their
opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation. The prosecution was going to use
the dramatic facts of a similar prior offense, and Rompilla’s counsel had a duty to
make all reasonable efforts to learn what they could about the offense. Reasonable
efforts certainly included obtaining the Commonwealth’s own readily available
file on the prior conviction to learn what the Commonwealth knew about the
crime, to discover any mitigating evidence the Commonwealth would downplay,
and to anticipate the details of the aggravating evidence the Commonwealth would
emphasize. Without making reasonable efforts to review the file, defense counsel
could have had no hope of knowing whether the prosecution was quoting
selectively from the transcript, or whether there were circumstances extenuating
278
the behavior described by the victim.

Moreover, as the Court recognized, “[t]he obligation to get the file was particularly
pressing here owing to the similarity of the violent prior offense to the crime
charged and Rompilla’s sentencing strategy stressing residual doubt.”279 Indeed,
“[w]ithout making efforts to learn the details and rebut the relevance of the earlier
crime, a convincing argument for residual doubt was certainly beyond any
hope.”280
In addition, the Court found trial counsel’s performance to be prejudicial
because, had the prior conviction file been consulted, then valuable mitigation
evidence could have been uncovered that could have been presented at the penalty
phase.281 As the Court stated, “[I]f the defense lawyers had looked in the file on
Rompilla’s prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of
mitigation leads that no other source had opened up.”282 For example, the files
contained records of “Rompilla’s prior imprisonment,” and “pictured Rompilla’s
childhood and mental health very differently from anything defense counsel had
seen or heard.”283 A file also contained an evaluation by a corrections officer that
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 385-86.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. The Court also stated:
Nor is there any merit to the United States’ contention that further enquiry into the prior
conviction file would have been fruitless because the sole reason the transcript was
being introduced was to establish the aggravator that Rompilla had committed prior
violent felonies. The Government maintains that because the transcript would
incontrovertibly establish the fact that Rompilla had committed a violent felony, the
defense could not have expected to rebut that aggravator through further investigation of
the file. That analysis ignores the fact that the sentencing jury was required to weigh
aggravating factors against mitigating factors. We may reasonably assume that the jury
could give more relative weight to a prior violent felony aggravator where defense
counsel missed an opportunity to argue that [the] circumstances of the prior conviction
were less damning than the prosecution’s characterization of the conviction would
suggest.
Id. at 386 n.4 (citations omitted).
281. Id.
282. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390.
283. Id.
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Rompilla was “reared in the slum environment of Allentown, Pa. . . . quit school at
16,” and had a series of incarcerations “related to over-indulgence in alcoholic
beverages.”284 In addition, the prior conviction file revealed “test results that the
defense’s mental health experts would have viewed as pointing to schizophrenia
and other disorders, and test scores showing a third grade level of cognition after
nine years of schooling.”285
Indeed, “[t]he accumulated entries [in the prior conviction file] would have
destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla’s upbringing and mental capacity
defense counsel had formed from talking with Rompilla himself and some of his
family members.”286 The entries likely would have led to further investigative
efforts, which would have uncovered that Rompilla’s “parents were both severe
alcoholics who drank constantly.”287 Furthermore, Rompilla “was abused by his
father, who beat him when he was young with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts
and sticks.”288 Rompilla also suffered from “organic brain damage, an extreme
mental disturbance significantly impairing several of his cognitive functions.”289
Ultimately, therefore, had counsel conducted his investigative efforts in an
objectively reasonable manner, the evidence would have amounted to “a mitigation
case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the
jury . . . .”290 Based upon the totality of all these factors, the Court held that
Rompilla had been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel.291
Consequently, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are less about the Court
284. Id. at 390-91.
285. Id. at 391.
286. Id. The Court further explained:
With this information, counsel would have become skeptical of the impression given by
the five family members and would unquestionably have gone further to build a
mitigation case. Further effort would presumably have unearthed much of the material
postconviction counsel found, including testimony from several members of Rompilla’s
family.
Id.
In addition, as specifically summarized, by a dissenting judge on the Third Circuit:
Rompilla’s parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly. His mother drank
during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers eventually developed
serious drinking problems. His father, who had a vicious temper, frequently beat
Rompilla’s mother, leaving her bruised and black-eyed, and bragged about his cheating
on her. His parents fought violently, and on at least one occasion his mother stabbed his
father. He was abused by his father who beat him when he was young with his hands,
fists, leather straps, belts and sticks. All of the children lived in terror. There were no
expressions of parental love, affection or approval. Instead, he was subjected to yelling
and verbal abuse. His father locked Rompilla and his brother Richard in a small wire
mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled. He had an isolated background, and
was not allowed to visit other children or to speak to anyone on the phone. They had no
indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children were
not given clothes and attended school in rags.
Id. at 391-92 (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 279 (Sloviter, C. J., dissenting) (citation
omitted)).
287. Id. at 391.
288. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392 (quoting Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 279).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 393.
291. Id.
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doctrinally altering its approach and more about its recognition of instances of truly
substandard representation where the defendant’s life was at stake. Nowhere in
these opinions did the Court intimate that Strickland was no longer the governing
law with respect to its analysis concerning ineffective assistance claims. In fact, in
each of these cases, the Court began its opinion by re-stating the two-pronged test
that defendants must satisfy in order to succeed in demonstrating a Sixth
Amendment violation. Furthermore, although the Court did rely to varying degrees
upon the ABA’s Guidelines, it was careful to note that these were only guides to its
analysis, not mandatory rules or benchmarks against which counsel’s performance
would be scrutinized. In fact, in Wiggins, the Court specifically rejected the use of
specific guidelines, holding that “[w]e have declined to articulate specific
guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead have emphasized that ‘[t]he
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.’”292
Thus, the Court’s decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla do not reflect a
fundamental “jurisprudential shift”293 in the Court’s ineffective assistance analysis,
but instead represent a reaction to truly sub-standard lawyering that prejudiced the
defendants in each case. Put another way, these cases are notable more for the facts
upon which they are based rather than any fundamental change in the governing
legal principles that are applied. Strickland remains good law, and defendants
continue to face an uphill battle in proving that trial counsel’s performance
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
In fact, recent statistics underscore that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla have
had, if anything, only a modest impact upon the success of ineffective assistance
claims brought in state and federal courts.294 For example, as stated above, from
1994 through 2000, only thirty-four ineffective assistance claims brought by capital
defendants at the state level were successful.295 In the six years following Williams,
and during the period in which Wiggins and Rompilla were decided, this number
increased to only forty-seven, as capital defendants continued to face courts that
were hostile to their ineffective assistance claims.296 Furthermore, at the federal
level, from 1994 through 2000, only thirty-two ineffective assistance claims
brought by capital defendants were successful.297 During the six years following
Williams, and during the time that Wiggins and Rompilla were decided, courts
remained reluctant to grant relief to defendants claiming ineffective assistance, as
only forty-seven claims navigated safely though Strickland’s two-pronged
standard.298 This can no more be characterized as a “jurisprudential shift”299 than
can the Court’s decisions be summarized as a shift toward the guidelines approach

292. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
293. But see Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 147 (“The jurisprudential shift is now evident and
established.”).
294. Id. at 156-57.
295. Id. at 156.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 156-57.
299. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 147.
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“once hailed by Judge Bazelon.”300
The truth is that such claims of a perceived shift are overstated. In fact,
Professor Neumann acknowledges that “a number of courts still remain hostile to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and are still willing to put a stamp of
approval on appallingly inadequate representation.”301 For example, as Professor
Neumann notes, since Williams, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has found
ineffective assistance in only one case.302 As Professor Neumann notes, “Some of
the cases affirmed by that court involved truly abysmal representation.”303 Indeed,
the Court denied an ineffective assistance claim where defense counsel failed to
present evidence “that the defendant . . . had ingested large amounts of a strong
psychoactive drug known to increase aggressive tendencies . . . along with other
narcotics and alcohol . . . at the time of the offense.”304 In addition, defense counsel
failed to present mitigation evidence “regarding the severe physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse the defendant endured as a child . . . at the hands of his grandparents .
. . and the sexual abuse his mother inflicted upon him.”305 Despite this evidence,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, after Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla had
been decided, denied this defendant’s ineffective assistance claim.306
Professor Neumann also recognizes that the Fifth Circuit continues to routinely
reject claims of ineffective assistance “in spite of strong evidence of attorney
incompetence.”307 For example, Professor Neumann cites one case where a
defendant’s trial counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence whatsoever,
despite evidence that the defendant “suffered from a chronic brain injury stemming
from an accident during his childhood”308 and “subsequent impaired intellectual
functioning.”309 In addition, counsel failed to present “testimony from his mother,
half-sister, aunt, and cousin regarding their love for defendant,”310 and the fact that
“he was young and intoxicated when he committed the murder and was extremely
remorseful.”311 Despite counsel’s failure to present any mitigating evidence, the
court denied the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, holding that such tactics
constituted reasonable “strategic” decisions under Strickland.312
Professor Neumann contends, however, “[t]he worst offender . . . is the Fourth
Circuit.”313 Specifically, “[i]t has repudiated every single ineffective assistance of
counsel claim raised by a death-sentenced inmate after Williams.”314 Amazingly, in
one case the court denied an ineffective assistance claim “despite the court’s
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 160.
See id. (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 161.
Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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acknowledgement that the bulk of counsel’s work in preparation for mitigation
occurred during the week that he was also participating in the guilt phase of the
trial and handling his partnership’s IRS difficulties, and that counsel’s ‘efforts were
certainly less than optimal.’”315 In fact, counsel had “attempted to withdraw . . .
‘when it became clear that his partnership’s financial difficulties would
unacceptably interfere with his representation, but the state court denied his
motion.’”316
In further underscoring the limits of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla,
Professor Neumann acknowledges that the Supreme Court’s nod to the ABA
Standards “is only relevant to the performance component of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims.”317 As Professor Neumann observes, “Strickland’s prejudice
prong, which requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, is
also badly in need of modification.”318 Indeed, as Professor Neumann notes, until
further reforms are implemented, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims will still
be difficult to win.”319
Consequently, courts at both the state and federal level continue to allow an
appallingly substandard level of representation to persist without remedy. Although
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are commendable for addressing situations of
blatantly incompetent representation, they do not represent a jurisprudential shift in
the Court’s approach to ineffective assistance adjudication. Instead, much of what
has happened post-Rompilla resembles what has happened post-Strickland: Trial
counsel are failing to present substantial and credible mitigating evidence, often
pertaining to social histories revealing a defendant’s severe physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse, as well as legitimate medical histories detailing organic brain
damage, psychiatric illnesses, and personality disorders. Despite these glaring
failures, state and federal courts continue to reject defendants’ claims of ineffective
assistance, labeling such calculations as permissible strategic decisions, or, even if
objectively unreasonable, insufficient to affect the outcome under Strickland’s
prejudice prong. The effect of these rulings is a capital sentencing system that
continues to tolerate incompetent performance by counsel. Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla did not effectuate systemic change. They merely signaled that the Court
was not going to tolerate obvious examples where attorneys had failed their clients
in life-and-death situations.
Systemic change, however, is exactly what is needed if the concept of
“effective” assistance is to become a reality for all criminal defendants, particularly
those against whom the death penalty is sought. As set forth below, this Article
proposes systemic change on the following four fronts, aimed directly at improving
the quality of legal representation: (1) the establishment of a Death Penalty
Representation Commission in each state, responsible for the promulgation of
specific and detailed guidelines that will direct trial counsel’s performance at the
sentencing phase of a capital case; (2) the contemplation of a more active trial
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. (quoting Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Id. (quoting Buckner, 453 F.3d at 202 n.5).
Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 164.
Id.
Id.
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court, which will be responsible, in various ways and through several means, for
ensuring adherence to the guidelines and representation that complies with
reasonable standards of professional competence; (3) substantive and meaningful
appellate review; and (4) elimination of Strickland’s prejudice requirement, while
retaining the “objectively reasonable” prong, with burden-shifting provisions
implemented depending upon defense counsel’s compliance with the relevant
guidelines.
This will ensure that the “objectively reasonable” analysis is applied in an
equitable manner, to reflect counsel’s actual performance at trial, demonstrated by
his compliance with specific guidelines that enumerate particular duties pertaining
to the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. Critically, the
following section will focus solely on the sentencing phase because, as discussed
above, counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence is the most
common ground upon which ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based.
IV. SYSTEMIC CHANGE TO ADJUDICATING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIMS: A NEW “GUIDELINE” APPROACH THAT IS CONNECTED TO A
PRESUMPTION-BASED “REASONABLENESS” ANALYSIS
This Article focuses upon the sentencing phase of capital trials because “many
capital defendants get no meaningful support at the sentencing phase. . . . [F]or this
reason, claims of ineffectiveness at the penalty phase are among the most common
issues raised in habeas corpus petitions by inmates on death row.”320
As a threshold matter, the systemic change proposed here involves the
following: (1) the formation of a Death Penalty Representation Commission in
each state that is responsible for researching, drafting, and developing specific
guidelines pertaining to the representation of defendants at the sentencing phase of
capital trials; (2) the compilation of detailed guidelines concerning trial counsel’s
performance at the sentencing phase, particularly as it relates to the investigation
and presentation of mitigating evidence; (3) the emphasis upon an active trial court,
which is responsible both for ensuring compliance with the guidelines and ordering
corrective measures where potential instances of incompetent representation are
identified; and (4) an elimination of Strickland’s prejudice requirement on appellate
review, in favor of a burden-shifting “reasonableness” analysis that is based upon
counsel’s compliance with these standards and overall performance at the
underlying trial.
The necessity for such guidelines is motivated by three primary factors. First,
at the sentencing phase in a capital trial, the defendant’s life is at stake, and thus the
necessity to present skillfully all relevant evidence relating to the defendant’s
background and character could not be more pressing. Indeed, “[a]t the penalty
phase of a capital case, the central issue . . . is the highly-charged moral and
emotional issue of whether the defendant . . . is a person who should continue to
live.”321 Thus, at this stage, “it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information

320. Cooley, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting Mickenberg, supra note 37, at 59).
321. Id. at 42 (quoting Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 334-35 (1983)).
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be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.”322 “Relevant
mitigating information” is that which “casts [defendants] in a more sympathetic
light.”323
Second, as a practical matter, although many commentators have advocated for
modifications to the manner in which attorneys are appointed to represent capital
defendants, the truth remains that “approximately ninety percent of capital
defendants are indigent”324 and thus receive the services of each state’s public
defender system. Of course, while “some indigent defendants are appointed quite
competent counsel,”325 in states “that do not adequately fund or train public
defenders, ‘[t]oo often, assistance of counsel for the poor can be like getting brain
surgery from a podiatrist.’”326 As a result, “[w]ithout proper representation, the
current standards adopted by the Supreme Court [in Strickland] allow indigent
defendants . . . to be killed by the state with minimal protection.”327 For this
reason, the establishment of guidelines can, at the very least, contribute to
improving the quality of legal representation for those defendants who rely upon
attorneys provided by the states.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the presentation of mitigating evidence
at the penalty phase is a highly complex endeavor that requires the skill and
participation of professionals from a variety of fields and with varying expertise.328
Indeed, because a jury is constitutionally permitted to consider “all relevant
mitigating evidence”329 when rendering a life decision, mitigating factors include
matters such as “family history; youthfulness; underdeveloped intellect and
maturity; favorable prospects for rehabilitation; poverty; military service;
cooperation with authorities; character; prior criminal history; mental capacity;
[and] age.”330 In this way, “[t]he Court’s limitless rule with respect to mitigation
322. Id. at 24 (quoting Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)).
Cooley explains the reason for this:
All capital defendants face an uphill battle as they enter the guilt-innocence phase. The
American public has been continually inundated with deceptive stereotypes and
incomplete facts which purposely misrepresent the painful truths that afflict the lives of
capital defendants. The hill becomes even steeper once capital defendants are found
guilty of a monstrous crime. Once branded as a capital murderer, our capital sentencing
system leads us to perceive “capital defendants as genetic misfits, as unfeeling
psychopaths who kill for the sheer pleasure of it, or as dark, anonymous figures who are
something less than human.” Ultimately, media misperceptions and political falsehoods
regarding the character and propensity of violent criminals guarantee that most
prospective jurors will have no realistic or legitimate notions of mitigation. To
counteract these biases and partial truths, defense counsel needs to exploit the most
significant aspect of the Supreme Court’s mitigation jurisprudence.
Id. at 49.
323. Id. at 23 (quoting Charles Lane, Death Penalty of Md. Man Is Overturned, WASH. POST, June
27, 2003, at A01).
324. Levinson, supra note 33, at 149.
325. Id.
326. Id. (quoting DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 76-77 (1999)).
327. Id. at 150.
328. Cooley, supra note 9, at 60-62.
329. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990).
330. Cooley, supra note 9, at 48 (citations omitted).
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evidence enables defense counsel to construct a comprehensive, illustrative, and
life-saving social history of capital defendants.”331 This social history “cannot be
stressed enough”332 because “[w]hen determining whether to sentence an individual
to death, jurors often yearn for meaningful explanations of why the capital violence
resulted in the first place.”333
Critically, however, while “[t]he importance of social histories is obvious,”334
identifying the “most relevant aspects of the defendant’s life and the onset age of
such an investigation are not as evident.”335 Indeed, after a discussion of the
“necessary elements that counsel must consider when developing a mitigation
strategy . . . defense counsel, psychologists, and psychiatrists . . . realize the
enormity of mitigation investigations.”336 Thus, for these three reasons—the stakes,
likely inexperience of defense counsel, and complexity of mitigation evidence—the
development of specific guidelines during the penalty phase could not be more
vital.
A. The Establishment of a Death Penalty Representation Commission
At the outset, the success of any guidelines-driven system depends upon the
quality of its drafters. As a result, this Article proposes that each state should
develop a Death Penalty Representation Commission (“Commission”), comprised
of attorneys, judges, scholars, and commentators with intimate familiarity of the
processes relating to death penalty representation in the state within which such
guidelines will be promulgated. Importantly, before enunciating specific
guidelines, the Commission should conduct in-depth research with the purpose of
identifying each capital case, over the previous ten-year period, that was prosecuted
in that particular state. In so doing, the Commission should analyze in detail the
specific arguments made by both the prosecution and the defense during the
penalty phase, with particular emphasis upon the evidence that the defense adduced
to mitigate the defendant’s culpability. The Commission should study both the
type of evidence that was produced, along with the manner in which it was
introduced. In addition, the Commission should identify the frequency with which
experts were used, including psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists, along
with other evidence that tended to be offered in an attempt to spare the defendant’s
life.
331. Id. at 49-50.
332. Id. at 50.
333. Id. Cooley further explains:
First, because capital trials are structured to dehumanize capital defendants, evidence
must be gathered that depicts the defendant as a human being with civilizing attributes.
Second, evidence needs to be offered that makes the capital violence as humanly
understandable as possible. Third, evidence tending to illustrate the high likelihood that
the defendant will be productive within a correctional setting is critical. Fourth,
evidence that can successfully refute the State’s aggravating evidence must also be
presented. Fifth, any evidence of mitigating circumstances surrounding the capital crime
itself needs to be incorporated into the penalty phase.
Id. at 52.
334. Id. at 51.
335. Id.
336. Cooley, supra note 9, at 51.
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The Commission should also assess the frequency with which family histories,
medical histories, educational histories, and other relevant data were used, and
detail the emphasis that defense attorneys customarily place upon each piece of
mitigating evidence. The Commission should also study the many cases in which
defense counsel elected not to pursue a mitigation strategy and examine the reasons
underlying such decisions as set forth in the record. From this data, the
Commission should look at each jury’s verdict in every case, and, using this
information, the Commission should seek to discern a pattern or patterns that
indicate the types and kind of mitigation evidence that was most effective and
influential. From this research the Commission will be able to develop two sets of
information. First, it will be able to “rank” or identify for attorneys litigating
capital cases the specific mitigating evidence most commonly used by defense
attorneys at the sentencing phase. Second, the Commission will be able to set forth
in the same manner the type of evidence that has been found to be most influential
or favorable to the defendant. While this will serve as a preliminary guide for trial
counsel, the most important role of this research is that it will allow the
Commission to promulgate informed, detailed, and purpose-driven guidelines.
1. The Commission’s Specific Guidelines
The Commission’s guidelines should be specific and endeavor to assist
counsel in both investigating and preparing the most effective mitigation defense
possible. In other words, the guidelines should serve to assist counsel in identifying
the sources of potentially mitigating evidence, the specific experts—social workers
and psychologists—who can assist counsel in organizing, presenting, and testifying
concerning such evidence, and the best methods by which to present such evidence
to a jury. The guidelines should therefore operate to assist the attorney in putting
forth the most persuasive mitigation defense possible, consistent with trial
counsel’s role to present his client in the most sympathetic—and truthful—light
possible to the sentencing jury.
Having said that, the guidelines should be drafted in a check-list format that
specifically identifies each aspect of the defendant’s background that the attorney is
required to investigate and, correspondingly, all experts with whom the attorney is
required to consult. Against this conceptual backdrop, each Death Penalty
Representation Commission will be responsible for drafting detailed guidelines that
focus upon counsel’s duty to investigate and present a compelling social history in
mitigation of their client’s culpability. The following represents a substantial
portion of the specific points that the guidelines should encompass in their initial
renditions.
a. Medical History
Counsel for every capital defendant should be required to investigate his
client’s medical history. Indeed, “[t]he defendant’s medical history is crucial
because most jurors find medical reasons for capital violence easier to accept and
understand than many other forms of mitigating evidence.”337 As one Commentator
337. Id. at 53.
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notes:
Counsel should determine whether the defendant suffers from any neurological
defects or whether the defendant experienced birth complications. Then, counsel
should determine whether the defendant has ever been exposed to toxins or
whether the defendant suffers from chronic illnesses. Finally, counsel should
determine whether the defendant was genetically endowed with a violent-prone
personality, whether the defendant has been diagnosed with brain impairments,
whether the defendant suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, or whether the
defendant is mentally retarded. Due to the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in
Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, mental retardation and youthfulness
338
(offenders under the age of eighteen) are categorical bars to the death penalty.

As a result, an investigation in the defendant’s medical history will be an important
aspect of any guideline system, due to its potential to produce highly relevant
mitigating evidence.
b. Psychiatric Disabilities
Critically, given “the high population of mentally impaired individuals on
death row, it is imperative that defense counsel explore whether defendants have
psychiatric disabilities.”339 As one Commentator notes, to “competently
investigate, accumulate, and present psychiatric evidence, defense counsel must (1)
appreciate the myriad of mental health issues relevant to criminal cases, (2) be
familiar with the various symptoms that defendants may exhibit, and (3) be aware
of the different diagnostic processes of psychologists and psychiatrists.”340
Likewise, “[s]pecialized attention must be channeled to ascertain whether the
defendant suffers from severe depression, postpartum depression, sleep disorders,
or a chemical dependency.”341
Additionally, trial counsel should “determine whether the defendant’s
intellectual functioning is impaired, whether the defendant suffers from epilepsy,
and whether the defendant was physically or sexually abused as a child.”342 With
respect to the issue of abuse, whether physical or sexual, “the jury must be
provided with concrete illustrations of the abuse so that it may understand its
general and long-term effects.”343 Lastly, efforts should be made to “determine
whether the defendant has ever attempted suicide, or . . . exhibit[ed] psychopathic
or anti-social personality traits.”344
Importantly, to obtain this information, defense counsel must investigate a
variety of sources. Such sources include the “defendant’s family members; the
defendant’s former schools (i.e., elementary, middle, high school, trade schools,
and colleges); the defendant’s military institution(s), juvenile court and prison

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Cooley, supra note 9, at 54-55.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 55.
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records; and the defendant’s medical and psychiatric records.”345
c. Drug and Alcohol Addiction
Not surprisingly, “the defendant’s drug and alcohol history must be thoroughly
assessed.”346 Trial counsel must also investigate whether the defendant was under
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense.347 In doing so, trial
counsel should: (1) consult with individuals who were with the defendant on the
day that the alleged crime occurred; (2) analyze the crime scene evidence; (3)
“review the post-arrest medical records; and (4) ‘talk to as many eyewitnesses as
possible.’”348 If evidence of an addiction is discovered, “defense counsel must then
consult with medical [and] psychiatric experts to determine how the addiction [or]
intoxication may have affected the defendant’s behavior on the day the capital
violence was perpetrated.”349
d. Comprehensive Family Investigation
Importantly, a “comprehensive family investigation must be conducted to
garner a more holistic understanding of how the defendant’s family dynamics may
have contributed to the capital violence.”350 Specifically, defense counsel should
investigate “whether there was material discord between the defendant’s parents;
whether the parents were substance abusers; ‘the relationship of the parents to the
defendant and other siblings’; whether any family members have a criminal
history; and whether there has been a history of mental illness in the family.”351 In
addition—and closely related to family history—counsel should investigate the
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Cooley, supra note 9, at 56.
Id.
Id. As Cooley explains:
Embarking on a family investigation is similar to “constructing a series of concentric
circles.” The innermost circle starts with the defendant and expands to his or her
immediate family. Cessie Alfonso, an experienced mitigation specialist, has argued that
to fully appreciate the complexities of this inner most circle, a “generational analysis”
must be performed. To carry out a generational analysis, it is essential “to gain the
family’s trust.” Doing so will likely require defense counsel to meet with the defendant
and his or her family members on several occasions. Thus, developing this rapport and
trust takes a considerable amount of time and energy. Moreover, family members may
oppose any attempts to uncover certain family secrets even if the information may prove
beneficial to the defendant’s mitigation case. After methodically investigating the
defendant’s immediate family, defense counsel must then interview “the spreading
circles of people and institutions that the defendant had contact with during the course
of his life.” As a result, interviews with “friends, neighbors, schoolteachers, clergy,
coaches, employers, co-workers, physicians or therapists” are essential. These
individuals can offer personal details that immediate relatives may not be willing to
disclose. Furthermore, this “investigation must include acquaintances who do not have
such a stake in the trial so as to get accurate information untainted by the desire of the
family and others to hide their dirty laundry.”
Id. at 57-59 (citations omitted).
351. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
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defendant’s educational history, including schools attended, grades achieved,
attendance records, specific instructors, the occurrence of any psychological
evaluations, and scholastic awards.352 Finally, in compiling the defendant’s social
history, “defense counsel must then interview ‘the spreading circles of people and
institutions that the defendant had contact with during the course of his life.’”353
This will normally include “friends, neighbors, schoolteachers, clergy, coaches,
employers, co-workers, physicians or therapists.”354
Thus, as the above information demonstrates, the areas of investigation and
discovery of potentially mitigating evidence are substantial. Perhaps most
critically, however, “[b]ecause capital sentencing requires an all-encompassing
inquiry into the defendant’s mental health and social life, counsel must ultimately
turn to the mental health and social work professions for assistance.”355 In fact,
“[t]hese professions have the necessary experts who can guide attorneys in
researching and developing relevant mitigating evidence.”356 Commonly referred to
as “mitigation specialists,” mental health and social work experts are indispensable
in compiling a persuasive social history for the defendant, and thus should be an
integral part of every state’s guideline paradigm.
2. Mitigation Specialists
Significantly, while trial counsel may be able to identify all of the necessary
areas within which mitigating information may be located, counsel often lacks the
knowledge or resources to locate such substantial amounts of information. As a
result, “[m]itigation specialists . . . possess the training, experience, and
wherewithal to bring together the massive amounts of information needed to
develop a life-saving mitigation strategy.”357
By definition, mitigation specialists are those “‘qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, or training as a mental health or sociology professional to investigate,
evaluate, and present psychosocial and other mitigating evidence to persuade the
sentencing authority . . . that a death sentence is an inappropriate punishment.’”358
Mitigation specialists often have degrees in social work, which enables them “to
not only hunt down the necessary documentation, but also to offer holistic
perspectives that can effectively and sympathetically explain why the capital
violence occurred in the first place.”359 Ultimately, the role of the mitigation
352. Id.
353. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
354. Cooley, supra note 9, at 58.
355. Id. at 59.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. (quoting Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: The Use of
Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359, 367-68 (1997)).
359. Id. at 61. Importantly, Cooley explains why psychologists and psychiatrists are not well-suited
to conduct mitigation investigations:
Psychologists and psychiatrists are highly educated professionals. Nevertheless, their
training and education, though impressive, does not enable them to perform the
mitigation specialist’s “intimidating and time consuming task[s].” When psychiatrists or
psychologists conduct capital evaluations, success often depends on the amount of
freedom afforded to them to carry out their detailed and time-consuming diagnostic
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specialist is as follows:
[T]o provide the attorney with an all inclusive social history of the client, which
includes identifying significant, positive and negative, traumatic life events . . .
includ[ing] information on the parental figures in the client’s life . . . [and] the
social factors that made the client different from siblings and other[s] who may
have been subjected to the same environment. . . . Another essential role of the
mitigation specialist is to assist attorneys in communicating more efficiently with
the defendant, his or her family members, and other significant mitigation
witnesses. Similarly, if not more importantly, mitigation specialists are responsible
for acting as liaisons between other mental health experts (i.e. psychologists [and]
360
psychiatrists) and defense counsel.

In this way, “[w]hen [properly] utilized, mitigation experts can aid both counsel
and other mental health experts.”361
Perhaps most importantly, however, is the assistance that mitigation specialists
provide to defense counsel in the investigatory or fact-finding process. Without
mitigation specialists, defense counsel simply could not—and would not—be able
to compile the type of social history that would adequately capture the relevant
aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and personality.362 For example,
in compiling a life-saving social history, mitigation specialists routinely investigate
the following avenues:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Maternity and birth records (seeking information relating to fetal alcohol
syndrome, head trauma at birth, or prenatal drug addiction);
School records (seeking early psychological or psychiatric evaluations);
Other agency records (i.e., foster care systems or public health agencies);
Military records (revealing information such as education, psychological
evaluations, disciplinary actions, work assignments and addiction problems);
Family medical records (revealing medical and psychiatric disorders and
possibly physical or sexual abuse);
Criminal and prison records (a clean criminal record may be a mitigating
factor, while post-incarceration behavior is admissible at sentencing, and thus
must be known to defense counsel);
Employment history (revealing work-related injuries, work assignments,
duties, awards, and any disciplinary actions);

assessments. Therefore, one major distinction would be having to travel to distant and
far-off localities to gather documentation and to interview innumerable witnesses.
Moreover, assembling the necessary documents requires expertise in locating and
acquiring social service, mental health, education, employment, military, and medical
documents. Psychiatrists and psychologists, for the most part, are not familiar with the
various means by which these documents can be legally acquired from governmental
agencies or private corporations. Furthermore, many psychiatrists and psychologists
have pre-existing time constraints arising from non-death penalty related commitments .
. . . This is not to say, however, that psychologists and psychiatrists should not be
utilized in capital defense litigation . . . . Their employment, nonetheless, should focus
on interpretational (e.g., whether the defendant’s psychological testing indicates a
particular mental abnormality) rather than retrieval or investigative assignments.
Id. at 62-63.
360. Cooley, supra note 9, at 61.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 63-65.
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Psychological testing (revealing abnormally low IQ so that death cannot even
be a consideration); and
Evidence of drug and alcohol abuse (revealing a possible diminished capacity
defense or mitigating premeditation).363

Stated simply, “[t]he amount of information that is uncovered during
mitigation investigations is literally beyond measure.”364 Ultimately, “[a]ttorneys .
. . simply lack the investigative tenacity to perform this potentially limitless
investigation [and] . . . [m]itigation specialists . . . can utilize their specialized
training . . . to construct humanizing and sympathetic portrayals of the
defendant.”365 When defense counsel “employ mitigation specialists they are
reinforcing the cardinal rule in capital defense work—to save the defendant’s life,
it takes a team effort.”366 Thus, because “[a]n increasing number of state and
federal appellate courts have held defense counsel ineffective because they failed to
meticulously investigate their client’s background to uncover mitigating
evidence,”367 the use of mitigation specialists will be an important part of any
guideline system.
B. An Active Trial Court That Is Designed to Ensure Compliance with the
Guidelines and Empowered to Issue Corrective Measures
Importantly, an active trial court is essential to the proper administration of this
proposal. The trial court shall serve three primary functions: (1) to ensure
compliance with the Commission’s guidelines with respect to the search for
potentially mitigating evidence (the “investigatory” phase); (2) to ensure that
counsel’s presentation of relevant mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury
comports with reasonable levels of professional competence (the “performance”
phase); and (3) to issue corrective measures where instances of potential
incompetence or substandard performance are identified, at either the investigative
or performance phases.
1. The Investigative Phase
The trial court’s first obligation will be to ensure compliance with the
Commission’s relevant guidelines regarding the search for mitigating evidence. As
an initial matter, the guidelines should require that each attorney’s initial
investigative efforts consist of a search into four categories pertaining to the
defendant’s social profile: (1) medical history; (2) psychiatric disabilities or
psychological conditions; (3) history of drug or alcohol abuse; and (4) family
history. The Commission shall also set a specific timetable that these investigative
efforts be completed at least thirty days prior to the commencement of the penalty
phase, to ensure that, if the court deems such efforts insufficient or incomplete,
corrective measures can be undertaken without prejudice to the defendant.

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Cooley, supra note 9, at 65.
Id.
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Importantly, after defense counsel completes each set of the investigative
process within the four categories, he must certify to the court, upon completion of
each category, that a full and thorough search for all relevant mitigating evidence
has been completed. In rendering such certification, defense counsel must state the
specific types of documents and records that were searched under each category in
an attempt to uncover mitigating evidence. Furthermore, in completing this more
specific aspect of the certification, the court will require defense counsel to furnish
information concerning the mitigation specialists who were enlisted to assist in
compiling the necessary records under the specified category.
Critically, due to the substantial amount of information that is likely to be
uncovered, and the variety of sources from which it may be derived, the
investigative efforts by defense counsel alone will not be deemed sufficient, and
should be automatic grounds for an order directing counsel to re-commence
investigative efforts for that category. Put another way, the court should expect,
and counsel should anticipate, that the search for mitigation evidence will entail the
retention of outside experts with specific expertise in certain areas relevant to
particular aspects of the defendant’s social history.
The guideline or checklist approach will allow counsel to waive or forego an
investigation into one or more of the categories if such investigation, in counsel’s
judgment, is deemed futile or tactically unnecessary. If counsel makes this
determination, he will have to certify to the court, in writing and with a detailed
explanation, precisely why any investigation into the specified category would be
futile, stating the reason with specificity. In addition, if such investigation is
justified with reference to “tactics” or “strategy,” an explanation justifying such
decision will likewise be required.
Ultimately, defense counsel’s compliance with the investigative phase
will be based upon a certification to the court first identifying the investigative
efforts for a particular category, for example, medical history, which will be
followed by a more detailed explanation of the sources that were searched, and
evidence that was obtained in the course of counsel’s investigation, which shall be
conducted in conjunction with the efforts of a mitigation specialist that is enlisted
to aid in such efforts. As stated above, if counsel decides to waive or forego
investigation into a particular category or source, it shall furnish an explanation
accompanying the certification explaining the reasons for such a decision.
The court shall then examine the quality and thoroughness of the investigation
for each category, to ensure that its breadth and scope is sufficiently likely to
identify mitigating evidence relevant to the issue of the defendant’s culpability. The
court will also be responsible for reviewing the substantive explanations for any
waivers that counsel asserts on the defendant’s behalf, and assessing whether the
reasons for such a decision is based upon a prudent assessment of the law and facts.
Ultimately, if the trial court is not satisfied with the scope or direction of defense
counsel’s investigation, it shall have the power to issue an order directing that
counsel’s investigation into particular categories or sources resume, and the court
shall also have the power to order counsel to obtain supplemental professional
assistance to aid counsel where it deems necessary and just. The purpose of
creating a more active trial court is both to ensure defense counsel’s accountability
and to also prevent Sixth Amendment violations before they might otherwise occur.
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2. The Performance Phase
Significantly, the search for and retention of powerful mitigating evidence will
serve little purpose unless it is presented to the sentencing jury in a compelling
manner that portrays the defendant’s background, character, and personal history in
the most sympathetic light possible. For this reason, in addition to having oversight
concerning the investigatory aspect of the penalty phase, the trial court shall also
have an active role with respect to trial counsel’s preparation of and presentation to
the jury of the various mitigating evidence that has been compiled.
In this way, the trial court will be responsible for actively overseeing the
manner and method by which defense counsel proffers mitigating evidence before
the sentencing jury to ensure that, at the very least, counsel is doing so in a manner
that is consistent with reasonable standards of professional competence. Of course,
the trial court shall be admonished never to engage in subjective judgments or
intrusive comments regarding trial counsel’s strategy or tactics. Instead, the trial
court will have the power to identify potential situations of incompetent
representation as it arises, so that corrective measures can be undertaken.
At the conclusion of trial, if the court is satisfied with the investigatory and
performance aspects of counsel’s representation, then the court shall certify in
writing that, in its view, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been
preserved. Importantly, however, in certifying that counsel’s performance is
consonant both with Sixth Amendment strictures and prevailing professional
norms, the court shall explain in detail precisely why it arrived at this conclusion,
with reference to both the particular facts of each case and the law upon which its
decision is predicated. In doing so, the trial court will create a more specific record
upon which the appellate court can conduct a meaningful and substantive review.
This system is designed to promote several objectives. First, it is intended to
improve the quality of representation of capital defendants during that phase of the
trial when their lives are at stake. Second, it is designed to hold defense counsel
responsible and accountable for incompetent representation. Third, it prevents trial
courts from sitting idly by when counsel completely fails to responsibly exercise
their duty to advocate on behalf of their clients, a duty that is no more important
than when a jury is deciding between life and death. Finally, it simply seeks to
promote a more just and fair society. The representation of capital defendants that
the post-Strickland world has allowed has been truly offensive. The time for
change is now.
C. The Appellate Review Process: Elimination of Strickland’s Prejudice Prong in
Favor of a Presumption-Based Reasonableness Analysis
This Article proposes that Strickland’s prejudice prong be eliminated368 in
368. At the outset, this Article posits that the actual compliance with, adherence to and enforcement
of specific guidelines by the trial court will obviate the need for any “prejudice” analysis because the
trial court, in its more active function of ferreting out incompetent representation as its occurs, will be
able to rectify potential ineffective assistance before the penalty phase commences. In this way, the
guidelines, as a functional matter, operate in a preventative manner by contemplating active trial court
intervention through scrutiny of counsel’s certification regarding the area and scope of mitigation
efforts.
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favor of a presumption-based “reasonableness” analysis that is predicated upon: (1)
the correctness of the trial court’s certification regarding counsel’s investigation
and performance at the penalty phase; (2) counsel’s compliance with the relevant
guidelines governing both investigation and performance; and (3) counsel’s actual
performance at the penalty phase.369 The occurrence of these steps will
fundamentally alter the framework for appeals alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note the precise appellate court, state
or federal, that will be involved at each stage of the appeals process, because this
will determine whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) are implicated. After a conviction, a defendant will
normally move for a new trial on several grounds, including ineffective assistance,
before the same judge that presided over the initial trial. Based upon the proposal
set forth above, it is virtually guaranteed that the trial court will re-affirm the same
certification that was made previously approving trial counsel’s performance. The
defendant, therefore, will almost certainly lose at this phase.
Subsequently, the defendant will initiate post-conviction proceedings in the
state courts, which will involve the appellate courts of the state in which the
defendant was convicted. It is in these proceedings where this Article’s proposed
appellate review framework (elimination of the “prejudice” requirement in favor a
presumption-based reasonableness analysis) commences.
In the event that a defendant claims, in a state post-conviction relief petition,
that trial counsel was ineffective at the underlying trial, the state appellate review
process shall occur in the following manner. First, the state appellate court will
have at its disposal a detailed and comprehensive record by which to assess both
the decisions of the trial court and the actions of counsel. Against this backdrop,
the appellate court’s initial task will be to assess the propriety of the trial court’s
decision certifying that counsel’s representation was consistent with prevailing
369. Before turning to this framework, it is critical to note that federal habeas petitions in capital
cases are now governed by the AEDPA. See Williams, supra note 10, at 134-35. The AEDPA provides
tremendous deference both to a state court’s findings of fact and legal conclusions. Id. at 135, 143.
Specifically, as Professor Williams notes, “[I]n order to grant a capital defendant’s request for habeas
relief, a federal court must find that the state court’s adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Id. at 143 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002)). Based
upon Supreme Court precedent, a state court adjudication is contrary to federal law if “the state court
applies a rule that contradicts that governing law set forth in our cases” or if “the state court decides a
case differently that [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” See id. at
143-44 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). Thus, a “state court unreasonably applies federal law if it
‘identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to
the particular facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.’” Id. at 144 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at
407). As a practical matter, federal courts typically evaluate state court decisions under the
unreasonableness prong of the AEDPA, because they almost always identify Strickland as the governing
legal standard. Id. Importantly, however, under the “unreasonableness” prong, it is not sufficient to
“convince a federal habeas court that the state court was incorrect in its application of Strickland . . . .
[Instead] a capital defendant must demonstrate that the state court applied Strickland in an objectively
unreasonable manner.” Id. As a result, “the state court’s determination will be sustained if it is ‘at least
minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.’” Id. (quoting Conner v. McBride,
375 F.3d 643, 664 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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professional norms. In making this determination, the appellate court shall first
review the text of the trial court’s decision regarding certification which, as stated
above, will explain in depth both the factual and legal underpinnings of its
decision. The appellate court will then be in a position to assess, whether the
court’s decision was predicated upon sound factual and legal bases.
In addition to reviewing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court shall
review in-depth the certification of trial counsel, which will state with specificity
the precise categories of information that were searched and the particular sources
from which mitigating evidence was derived. In examining counsel’s certification,
the appellate court will be in a position to assess the breadth of counsel’s
investigation, and determine whether the decision to investigate itself, both in kind
and degree, was proper based on the relevant facts. In addition, the appellate court
will also review specific waivers by counsel into certain areas of potentially
mitigating evidence, and in assessing the propriety of such waivers, be in a position
to issue meaningful decisions that guide future behavior for trial counsel in capital
cases.
After reviewing the trial court’s decision and counsel’s certification, the
appellate court will also have the opportunity to directly review the record to
examine the manner and method by which counsel presented defendant’s
mitigating evidence to the jury. In other words, the appellate court’s role will be to
ensure that mere technical compliance with the guidelines is not sufficient. Instead,
counsel must be able to marshal these resources into a compelling story that
portrays the defendant’s background, character and history in the most
sympathetic—and truthful—light. This is the essence of effective representation.
After consulting the trial court’s decision, counsel certifications, the record for
both errors of commission and omission, if the appellate court believes that the trial
court’s decision to certify that defense counsel complied with the guidelines, both
in investigation and actual performance, was proper, then this shall create a
presumption that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable as a matter of
law. This presumption will be predicated both upon the trial court’s oversight role
and the fact that it possessed the ability to implement corrective measures during
the penalty phase if it deemed counsel’s mitigation efforts insufficient. Thus,
should the defendant subsequently allege ineffective assistance of counsel, he will
be responsible for rebutting this presumption by adducing specific evidence
demonstrating that counsel’s representation was ineffective.
However, if based upon its review of the record, the appellate court determines
that the trial court’s certification decision was erroneous, then there shall exist a
presumption in favor of the defendant that such representation was ineffective as a
matter of law, and the burden will be upon the state to adduce evidence that defense
counsel’s performance was consistent with prevailing professional norms. In other
words, Strickland’s reasonableness prong will be strengthened substantially under
this system, and serve as a substantial barrier to defendants seeking to assert
ineffective assistance claims, as well as to prosecutors seeking to gain a benefit
from truly substandard representation. Furthermore, in rendering its decision, the
appellate court should state with specificity the precise reasons, both with
references to law and fact, upon which its decision is based. The court should
particularly emphasize those facts that it found critical to supporting the decision
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that counsel’s performance was reasonable, and it should explain precisely why
certain decisions made both in the investigative and performance phases warranted
a finding of reasonableness. In doing so, the appellate courts can serve an important
function in providing guidance to both the Commission and future counsel in
capital cases concerning the standards that will be expected before a determination
of reasonableness will be justified. The Commission can then use this data to
update their guidelines and, as a result, the guidelines themselves can evolve,
resulting in an overall improvement in the quality of legal representation for all
criminal defendants.
It must be noted, however, that this system will undergo some degree of
change when the defendant exhausts appellate efforts in the state court system and
commences habeas relief efforts at the federal level. Indeed, once federal habeas
relief is sought, the provisions of the AEDPA are implicated, which, broadly
speaking, provide substantially more deference to the trial court’s factual and legal
determinations. Specifically, under the AEDPA, “[i]n order to grant a capital
defendant’s request for habeas relief, a federal court must find that the state court’s
adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.’”370
Now, in the current state of federal jurisprudence, it is highly unlikely that the
courts are going to unilaterally abandon Strickland and suddenly eliminate the
prejudice prong. In addition, under the AEDPA, it is not sufficient to “convince a
federal habeas court that the state court was incorrect in its application of
Strickland . . . . [Instead] a capital defendant must demonstrate that the state court
applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner.”371 In other words, “the
state court’s determination will be sustained if it is ‘at least minimally consistent
with the facts and circumstances of the case.’”372
However, the provisions of the AEDPA do not provide any obstacle
whatsoever to the proposal in this Article because this Article is advocating that the
law itself needs to be changed, while the AEDPA is merely addressing the level of
deference to which lower courts are entitled when conducting ineffective assistance
analysis of the extant law. Also, the AEDPA provides that a federal court can
overturn a state court decision that is contrary to or involves an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. Thus, when reviewing the decisions
of state or lower federal courts, appellate courts will likely never overturn a
decision based upon the “contrary to” language, because courts will almost always
identify Strickland as the controlling legal standard.
Critically, however, the AEDPA permits reversal of a state appellate or lower
federal court decision where it involves an “unreasonable application” of such law,
and this is precisely the point at which appellate courts exercise the authority to
engage in meaningful review of the trial court’s decision and counsel’s
performance. Specifically, if the appellate court believes that the trial court’s
certification was based upon an improper assessment of counsel’s performance, or
370. Id. at 143 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002)).
371. Id. at 144.
372. Id. (quoting Conner, 375 F.3d at 664).
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that counsel’s investigation was insufficient, then it will have grounds upon which
to reverse pursuant to the AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” provision. Stated
simply, while the AEDPA does provide more deference to the state courts’ factual
and legal findings, it does not give them the authority to act in a manner that is
inconsistent with either the Sixth Amendment or the most basic principles of
fairness and due process. This point is no more underscored than the fact that
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla—the only cases where the Supreme Court has
ever found ineffective assistance—were decided because the lower court, in the
majority’s view, “unreasonably applied” Strickland’s two-pronged test.373 In short,
the AEDPA is not an obstacle to finding that trial counsel acted in a manner
incongruous with prevailing professional norms. Furthermore, it is not an obstacle
to normative changes in the law that are based upon sound public policy.
Indeed, it can be evident under this system that Strickland’s prejudice prong is
unnecessary and should be eliminated. First, it is nearly impossible and certainly
impractical to discern whether the incompetent performance of counsel truly
affected the outcome of a trial. As the Court itself noted in Strickland, the
“distorting effects of hindsight”374 can surely not provide courts with the sufficient
context and given circumstances to know how each jury member may have reacted
to the inclusion of specific mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a trial. There
is simply no method by which to know how a juror would react to evidence that he
has never seen, and to ask a defendant who has been the victim of truly
incompetent representation to make such a showing is offensive to any notion of
fundamental fairness. In fact, that is precisely the point—being the victim of
incompetent representation, particularly when your life is at stake, should be
enough to warrant a Sixth Amendment violation.
A defendant should be required to prove no more to a court. Under the
Constitution, it should be sufficient to say that a defendant, whose life is at stake,
deserves relief when he has been the victim of truly abysmal representation.
Whether the outcome was affected should not be relevant, because the process
matters just as much as the outcome. This system is focused precisely upon a
process that engenders fairness, a fairness that aspires to improve the quality of
legal representation, something that the Strickland Court openly said it was not
seeking to accomplish.
V. CONCLUSION
It is disconcerting to realize that many criminal defendants have been the
victims of atrocious representation during capital trials yet have had no success in
pursuing their claims in the appellate courts and were subsequently executed. That
system, which resulted largely from Strickland’s nearly impregnable standards,
needs to change. The criminal justice system should not tolerate for one more day
attorneys whose performance during the capital trial practically guarantees that a
defendant will be sentenced to death. Instead, the standards for capital
representation should continually seek to improve the quality of legal
representation, not merely establish minimum standards that tolerate sleeping
373. See supra Part III.
374. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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lawyers, lawyers with substance abuse problems, and lawyers whose disciplinary
problems follow them all the way into the courtroom. This is not justice, and
Strickland is not justifiable.
This Article strives to implement lasting change through a simple solution that
bases itself on the fundamental values of accountability, transparency, and fairness.
Capital defendants deserve the best representation possible, and if they do not get
it, courts should provide a remedy regardless of prejudice. Deprivation of the right
to counsel in and of itself is an actionable Constitutional violation. However,
defendants should not have to wait until they are sentenced to death to obtain that
remedy. The implementation of guidelines and the contemplation of an active trial
court will ensure that potentially incompetent representation is identified and
corrected. Furthermore, if the trial judge ultimately decides erroneously that
counsel’s performance was competent, then the appellate court will have the
obligation and responsibility to review the reasonableness of counsel’s
performance and provide relief where the facts warrant. Under this system,
procedural fairness is critical to ensuring the overall efficacy of our system of
representation, which ultimately should provide for a system of representation that
vindicates the notion of effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

